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Abstract
Program analysis techniques have numerous applications in software optimization
and correctness. Focusing on software security, analyses like data flow analysis and
symbolic execution have been proven effective in many settings. Information-flow
security measures and bounds the propagation of sensitive information throughout
the code. Automatic vulnerability detection provides tooling for tracking and iden-
tifying potentially buggy code. Data flow analysis is scalable but imprecise due to
over-approximations. Symbolic execution is precise and sound but suffers on scala-
bility. In this thesis, we develop multiple dynamic and static analysis techniques that
employ data flow analysis and symbolic execution together to address imprecision
and scalability issues.
More specifically, we revisit quantitative information flow analysis where the goal
is measuring the amount of information flow from source to sink. We propose tech-
niques to enable the incorporation of symbolic influence measurement and improve
the precision of the final result. For static vulnerability detection, we propose a new
tool to effectively detect memory leak bugs in big codebases like an OS kernel even
in specialized modules. Our tool automatically identifies allocation and deallocation
functions, and then reasons about the true location of memory release. It also em-
ploys under-constrained symbolic execution to improve the true positive ratio. We
were able to detect numerous new memory leak bugs in the Linux kernel code. In
both scenarios, we employ data flow analysis to shrink the search space for symbolic
execution in a way that still can benefit from its precise property checking.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Data flow analysis has been employed in compiler optimization for a long time [1].
It represents global data relationships in a program via static analysis methods to
determine definition, use, and reach points of data in a control flow graph. Since then,
data flow analysis gained numerous applications in program analysis specifically in
security. By determining how data propagates through a program and where it is
used, data flow analysis can help in identifying security issues like uninitialized use,
resource leak, data leak, insecure argument to functions, etc. The type of data flow
analysis mostly used in security is taint analysis. In taint analysis, a meta-data value
is maintained for each value in the program to describe a special property of that value
(for example if it is attacker controlled). The taint property is propagated through
the program to other values whose computation is influenced by current tainted value.
For example, an addition operation which takes a tainted value and an untainted one,
produces a tainted result. Taint propagation is a binary property meaning that the
result either becomes tainted or not.
Data flow analysis and as a result, taint analysis both are conservative so they
may suffer from false positive reports. Pointer aliasing is a challenge to data flow
analysis. It is determining if two pointers are pointing to the same memory location
or not. Because of aliasing problem, false positives may occur in taint analysis.
1
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Another threat to data flow analysis is control flow sensitive data propagation and
complicated constraints leading to infeasible paths.
Symbolic execution is a program analysis technique to explore feasible paths in a
program without actually running it. Instead of providing actual input, the inputs
are symbols and execution proceeds as normal while the values may be symbolic
formulas. The technique is used extensively in software verification and testing, as
well as security. Symbolic execution can explore multiple paths by operating on
symbolic variables. Such variables can represent different concrete inputs. This is
useful in providing sound analysis for property checking. For each explored path
a boolean formula is maintained that describes the satisfied conditions along the
path, and a memory model maps variables to symbolic expressions or values. Each
store updates the memory map, while a branch instruction updates the path formula.
At each point a satisfiablity modulo theories (SMT) solver [5] can be used on the
path formula to check for property violation along the explored paths, or just the
feasibility of a path. Symbolic execution suffers on scalability. Path explosion is the
main source of scalability issues in symbolic execution, where the number of candidate
paths to explore may double at each branching point in the program. This leads to an
exponential growth of paths to explore, affecting both processing time and memory
requirements.
In this proposal, we combine data flow analysis with symbolic execution for se-
curity purposes. On one hand, symbolic execution can help data flow analysis by
removing false positives and improving precision. On the other hand, data flow
analysis can help reducing the search space for symbolic execution and improve its
scalability. More specifically, we revisit two security domains and propose improved
analysis techniques:
Information-flow Security. In information-flow security the goal is limiting the
information propagation through the program. For example, a public output of the
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program should reveal up to a threshold number of bits of information about its
secret input. In Chapter 3 we utilize symbolic execution to improve the precision of
quantitative information-flow analysis.
Static Vulnerability Detection. Programming languages like C that have little to
no automatic memory management, are prone to memory errors. With an emphasis
on resource release bugs, in Chapter 4 we propose a static vulnerability detection
technique that utilizes multiple data flow analyses to detect a potentially buggy point
in the code and then use symbolic execution to reduce false positives.
Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
In this chapter we cover background and related work on the two well-known and
classic program analysis techniques: data flow analysis and symbolic execution, and
their application in vulnerability detection.
2.1 Data Flow Analysis
Data flow analysis (DFA) determines how values of variables propagate throughout
program execution. It is a flow-sensitive analysis meaning that it relies on control flow
graph transitions to determine properties associated with each basic block. It defines
algorithms to infer properties at each execution point. Over the past four decades,
data flow analysis is extensively employed in compiler optimization, software testing,
verification, and security.
For a given statement s, the program point just before executing s is In(s), and
the program point just after executing s is Out(s). A forward analysis is a data
flow analysis that tracks the propagation from In to Out for each statement. In
contrast, a backward analysis is tracking the propagation from Out to In for each
statement. The building block properties of DFA are definition and use statements.
Every assignment is a definition of the variable assigned to. An statement that refers
4
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to a defined variable is a use for that variable. A definition reaches a point if there
exists a path from the definition to the point without re-definition. A re-definition
kills (overwrites) any previous definition. A def-use pair exists if there is at least one
path from the definition def that reaches the use. An expression is available at a
point if all the paths leading to the point contain a definition that reaches the point.
There is no need to re-evaluate an available expression if it is stored somewhere.
Availability analysis is a forward analysis that tracks the definitions from In to Out
for each statement on all paths leading to a point. A variable is live at a point in the
program if there exists a use on some paths originating from that point. Otherwise
the variable is dead. There is no need to cache dead variables. Liveness analysis is
a backward analysis that starts from each use and moves backward from Out to In
until it reaches a definition on the path.
Static data flow analysis analyzes the code without actually executing it. It can
cover all the available code but in some situations may need overapproximation to
account for the cases that the state of program variable cannot be determined before
execution1. Dynamic data flow analysis determines the variables propagation by
executing the program. It may fail to cover all reachable code, but can be more
precise in terms of which addresses of memory are accessed.
Static DFA has been used extensively in code optimization phase in compilers.
Some classic techniques include redundant sub-expression elimination [25, 35], con-
stant folding [24], variable folding [66], code motion [24, 25], dead code elimina-
tion [55], register allocation [6], etc. We refer readers to [54] for a survey on classic
data flow analysis algorithms.
More recent works have used dynamic data flow analysis to overcome the aliasing
challenges specifically in object oriented programming languages [27, 26]. Aliasing
is a well-known challenge for static techniques where the equivalence of two or more
1As an example, an access to an array element must be considered as an access to any element.
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pointer variables is in question. An static analysis either has to skip such challenging
cases, or over-approximate by conservatively considering any potential equivalence.
The information available at concrete execution helps to determine aliasing relation-
ships and as a result improve the precision of data flow analysis. It has been shown
that dynamic DFA can find data flow relations in programming languages like Java
which were being missed by a minimal static DFA or were over-approximated by
static alias analysis [26].
In the context of security and privacy, a more specialized data flow analysis is used
named taint analysis. In taint analysis some data (for example untrusted input from
the user) are assigned a special taint property. Throughout the taint analysis along
with maintaining def-use relations, the taint property is propagated to any variable
influenced by an already tainted variable. This way, taint analysis can help with
identifying information leakage or memory corruption bugs [93, 53, 104, 91, 92].
In Chapter 3 we enhance a dynamic taint tracking tool to construct a data flow
graph and track the propagation of secret data. In Chapter 4 we developed a static
taint analysis to track the propagation of memory allocations for the purpose of
vulnerability detection.
2.2 Symbolic Execution
Symbolic execution is another classic program analysis technique proposed in the mid
1970s which gained a lot of applications and popularity in last decade specifically in
security. In contrast to concrete execution where the program is run on a specific
set of inputs and a single control flow path is traversed, symbolic execution explores
multiple control flow paths by assuming symbolic inputs [9, 48, 59]. As a result it can
yield strong guarantees for property checking, i.e. no division by zero or no NULL
dereference happen throughout the code.
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1 void foo (int a, int b)
2 {
3 int x = 1;
4 if (a > 0){
5 x += a;
6 if (a == b)
7 x -= b + 1;
8 }
9 assert(x != 0);
10 }
(1) x = 1;
(2) if (a > 0)
(4) assert (x != 0);(3) x += a;
(5) if (a == b)
(7) assert(x != 0);(6) x -= b + 1;





Figure 2.1: Example of Symbolic Execution
Symbolic execution allows the program inputs take symbolic values and explores
all feasible control flow paths. The symbolic execution engine maintains a state
consisting of path condition, symbolic store, and the next statement to be executed.
Path conditions is a boolean formula describing conditions satisfied up to the current
execution point. The symbolic store is map from the variables to either concrete
values or symbolic expressions. Branch statements update the path condition and
assignment statements update symbolic store. At each point an SMT solver can
check the feasibility of path conditions and prune any infeasible state.
Figure 2.1 shows a simple function and its associated symbolic execution tree.
Each node shows the state number and the statement about to execute. We aim to
find the values of arguments that make the assertion at line 9 fail. To represent a
symbolic value we use α. Initially the function foo arguments are marked symbolic,
and path condition is True. So for state (1) the symbolic store is of the form {a 7→
αa, b 7→ αb}. In state (2) the symbolic store is {a 7→ αa, b 7→ αb, x 7→ 1}. As the
condition at line 4 is executed the symbolic engine forks to two states of (3) and (4)
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and updates the path conditions. For state (3) the path condition updates to {αa > 0}
while for state (4) the path condition will be {αa ≤ 0}. The arithmetic operations
update the values in symbolic store map. Therefore, in state (5) the map will be
updated to {a 7→ αa, b 7→ αb, x 7→ αa + 1}. Again, at state (5) the symbolic engine
forks to two states (6) and (7) and updates the path conditions appropriately. More
specifically, the path condition for state (6) will be {αa > 0 ∧ αa = αb}. The path
condition for state (7) will be {αa > 0∧ αa 6= αb}. The arithmetic operation at state
(6) updates the symbolic store at state (8) to {a 7→ αa, b 7→ αb, x 7→ αa+1−(αb+1)}.
After expanding all states until reaching the assert at line 9, we can evaluate for
what input values of a and b, the assertion may fail. Checking the conditions for
states (4), (7), and (8) reveals that only state (8) can make x 6= 0 false. In other
words, the condition {αa > 0 ∧ αa = αb ∧ αa + 1− (αb + 1) = 0} is satisfiable.
Symbolically executing real world programs often encounters scalability issues.
Language constructs like loops can increase the number of candidate states exponen-
tially. Therefore, exhaustively exploring all possible states does not scale. Addition-
ally, different modes of memory addressing and complex data structures, side effects
from libraries and system code, and complex SMT formulas pose challenges for the
symbolic execution engine. State of the art symbolic execution tools make different
assumptions and simplifications to address such challenges [38, 22, 17, 14, 13]. An in
depth survey on symbolic execution systems can be found in [4].
One of main limitations of classic symbolic execution is that it cannot reach many
feasible paths due to the resulting complicated path constraints [15]. A practical
idea to help with complex constraints and side effects of whole software stack is
to combine concrete and symbolic execution. Such techniques are generally named
concolic execution where the concrete execution of the program drives the symbolic
execution [62]. These techniques were proposed for test input generation, where the
engine maintains a concrete store along with symbolic store, and path constraints.
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The engine starts execution by some randomly selected or user provided concrete
inputs. It executes the program while updating path constraints and the two stores.
At each branching, symbolic execution takes same direction as concrete execution and
updates path conditions accordingly. Therefore the constraint solver is not invoked
on every branch. To explore different paths, the path conditions at some selected
branches can be negated and passed to SMT solver for feasibility check and new
input generation. This workflow can be repeated which helps in achieving higher
coverage in practice. DART [42] and SAGE [43] are two well known example of
concolic execution tools. They employ different strategies in choosing which branch
to negate next and generate new paths. S2E takes a different approach in combining
concrete and symbolic execution by proposing selective symbolic execution [21, 22]. It
allows selecting to symbolically execute only parts of the code by carefully changing
the execution mode from concrete to symbolic and vice versa. For example, assume
function F calls function G and the mode change is at the call site. If the change is
from concolic to symbolic, the arguments of G are made symbolic and it is explored
symbolically along with the concrete execution. Once finished, the concrete results
of G is returned to F , and F is continued concretely. If the change is from symbolic
to concrete, the arguments to G are concretized and after finishing G concretely, the
execution continues symbolically in F .
Path selection is another challenge for practical symbolic execution. That is be-
cause enumerating all feasible paths is impractical so different tools based on their
design goal employ different heuristics to prioritize which path to explore next. Be-
sides classic depth-first and breadth-first search algorithms that prioritize deep or
shallow paths respectively, probabilistic path selection is used extensively. For ex-
ample, KLEE [13] assigns probabilities to paths based on their length and favors
less explored ones to prevent starvation. Other heuristics designed for better code
coverage have been discussed in literature [14, 13, 22]. For example in [63] aims to
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explore less traversed parts of global control flow graph by maintaining a frequency
distribution for explored paths. In pursuit of finding memory corruption bugs, [17]
gives priority to paths with symbolic memory addresses or symbolic pointers.
Symbolic backward execution [28] is a variant of symbolic execution techniques
where the goal is to identify program inputs that can trigger execution of a specific
point the code. Therefore, the analysis starts from the target point in the code and
moves in the reverse direction of control flow. path conditions are collected as forwards
symbolic execution. At any point that a path is deemed infeasible, the engine discards
the path and backtracks to start a new one. A mixture of forwards and backward
symbolic execution is presented in [72]. The technique is named call-chain backward
symbolic execution, and starts from the function entry point of containing the target
code. Once feasible paths are found in this function, the tool selects one of the
function’s callers and looks for feasible paths from the caller entry point to the target
code. This process is repeated until a feasible path to target is found from the main
function of the program. The paths are prioritized based on a shortest-path distance
to the target in the inter-procedural control flow graph.
A practical approximation to avoid path explosion problem is reducing the code
to be analyzed. Under-constrained symbolic execution [32] serves to analyze a func-
tion in isolation. To do so, the function input and any global data that may affect
the function’s execution is marked symbolic and then the engine starts as normal
from the beginning of the function. Essentially a variable is under-constrained if the
engine does not collect the constraints on its value along the path from program’s
entry point up to the function. Therefore, there can be paths deemed as feasible
while they actually are not (it leads to false positive). That said, under-constrained
symbolic execution is proved to be more scalable and successful in finding bugs in
larger code [85, 10]. More specifically Sys [10] uses predefined static checkers to col-
lect potentially buggy code locations and then employs under-constrained symbolic
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execution on small code snippets to confirm the bugs. It marks the function argu-
ments and any locally allocated variables as under-constrained, and assumes memory
pointers cannot alias.
In Chapter 3 we use symbolic execution on a smaller regions of the code tandem
with bit-level taint analysis to mark exact symbolic data at the start of region. In
Chapter 4 we propose using a flavor of under-constrained symbolic execution to prune
infeasible paths and improve the precision of vulnerability detection.
2.3 Static Vulnerability Detection
In this section we review related work to our project presented in Chapter 4. More
specifically we look at static vulnerability detection techniques with a focus on ones
that cover an OS kernel.
Static Memory Leak Detection. Hector [90] aims to detect resource release
bugs in big code bases. It has been applied to the Linux kernel, but it is limited
to finding inconsistencies within a single function. It first annotates any resource
acquire/release operation at the function level, and then checks that each acquired
resource is paired with a release on any error handling path. Error-handling paths are
identified using the return value check. Any pointer-returning function is considered
a resource acquisition, and the associated release function is the last one taking the
acquired resource as an argument. Such broad definitions of resource acquisition
and release are mainly because Hector is designed as a general resource release bug
detector, not specifically for kernel memory leak detection. For example, based on
our study, there are 22675 pointer-returning functions in the Linux kernel. Hector
warns on situations where a resource is released on some paths through a function
and not on others. so it does not detect situations in which all the paths through a
function fail to release a resource. It also checks whether a resource is returned from
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a function, but not if it escapes via a pointer.
SATURN [102] tries to detect memory leaks via static path sensitive pointer analy-
sis. It reduces the memory leak detection problem to a Boolean satisfiability problem,
and then uses a SAT-solver to identify potential bugs. Other static memory leak de-
tection techniques have been proposed [96, 86, 39, 52, 78, 20], which to the best of
our knowledge were not scalable to OS kernel.
Deviation-based Analysis. Our use of mining in Chapter 4 is similar to Engler
et al.’s [31] proposal to infer bugs by looking for deviations from commonly observed
behavior. More specifically, they looked for NULL-pointer inconsistency through the
OS kernel and were able to detect multiple bugs.
Pattern mining has been employed in previous research for the purpose of program
analysis. In [65] the authors used mining on code revision history to find paired
functions. Found pairs are then checked at the run-time to find violations. The
approach is not flow sensitive, and relies on user input to enhance pattern matching.
The authors of [99, 45] applied sequential pattern mining for specification mining
by focusing on Java exception-handling code. Weimer and Necula [99] proposed
specification mining by focusing on error-handling code. They applied sequential
pattern mining to user-level programs written in Java. PR-Miner [64] uses frequent
item-set mining to infer programming rules without using user-defined templates. It
does not consider the sequence of operations. MUVI [70] uses a similar approach to
detect concurrency bugs. CHRONICLER [84] integrates sequential pattern mining
with a path-sensitive data flow analysis to identify precedence rules for a function
call. To the best of our knowledge none of these works were applicable to a large
system like an OS kernel.
Error-handling based Detection. Using error-handling code to detect bugs
was employed previously is many works. LRSan [97] and Crix [67] find classes of
missing-check bugs in the Linux kernel via employing error-handling code to identify
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critical variables. Other techniques analyzing error-handling code within the Linux
kernel include [46, 88, 3] where the error propagation is evaluated to detect potential
bugs. These techniques rely on explicit errno returning to identify error-handling
code. Based on our study, non-explicit error-handling cases are common, and missing
those, causes false negative. In our proposed system, such error-handling cases are
covered via critical check identification as described in Section 4.4.2.
Kernel Vulnerability Analysis. Because of the inherent complexity of the
OS kernel, analyzing the whole kernel is challenging. Therefore, first compiling the
whole kernel into LLVM IR became a practical approach. This facilitates the analy-
sis by employing LLVM passes. K-Miner [40] performs inter-procedural analysis by
extracting execution paths starting from system-calls to detect memory corruption
vulnerabilities. Without the ownership reasoning mechanism and the identification
of specialized allocators/deallocators, K-Miner has to analyze complicated data flows
globally, which is very hard. As a result it only focuses on the paths starting from
system calls. Dr. Checker [73] finds vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel drivers via
static data flow analysis. KINT [98] and UniSan [68] employ taint analysis to find
integer overflow and information leakage, respectively. SLAKE [19] provides an auto-
mated method to exploit vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel by extending LLVM for
its static analysis, in tandem with the fuzzer Syzkaller [44]. DCUAF [2] proposes a




Information-flow analysis aims to track information propagation throughout a pro-
gram in order to enforce limitations or detect property violations. A common example
is a program working on some secret input and generating publicly available output.
A security property can be that the program should not leak the secret input. From
data-flow perspective, it is almost impossible to avoid flows from the secret input
to the public output, but the security property can be like identifying unintended
flows from the secret input to the public output. A taint-based flow analysis suffices
for such scenario, where values in the program become tainted if they may contain
any amount of the secret data. The taint propagates throughout the program via a
simple rule: the result of an operation becomes tainted if any of the operands are
tainted. For example, copying a tainted value, transfers taint to the copy as well.
The problem with taint analysis is its binary nature: a value either is tainted or not.
Additionally, most implementations of taint analysis do not account for implicit flows.
In other words they miss to track indirect data relationship throughout the program
like previous control flow transfers leading the execution to a specific point.
Quantitative information-flow analysis, aims to answer the question of how many
bits of information from the secret input is revealed in the public output. Therefore,
14
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in this scenario a taint-based approach in not sufficient because the analysis needs
to measure the revealed bits and detect any violation if the amount is beyond a
threshold determined by the security policy. In this chapter, we discuss a quantitative
information flow analysis technique which models the data-flow as a network capacity
problem. The maximum possible information-flow from the network source (secret
input) to the network sink (public output), is measured by a max-flow algorithm.
Then we propose a symbolic execution enhancement that improves the precision of
the analysis without sacrificing the soundness.
3.1 Information Flow as Network Capacity
As mentioned, the quantitative information-flow analysis measures the bits that a
program actually reveals from its input. The technique that we are about to describe is
first proposed by McCamant and Ernst [75]. The tool named FlowCheck, guarantees
soundness by always overestimating the actual information flow. It employs bit-level
taint tracking, and also accounts for implicit data flows. As mentioned before, the
taint tracking can identify presence of data flow but cannot precisely measure it. For
example, if a secret data of 8-bits is copied into variable x, the taint propagates to
all 8-bits, but the total amount of secret information is still unchanged. FlowCheck
models the information flow as a network capacity problem. All possible information-
flow streams are explored to form a network of volumed channels, and the secret
information is modeled as incompressible fluid that might flow in those channels.
Then the maximum secret information that the program execution might reveal is
associated with the maximum rate of the fluid that can flow through the network.
Such maximum rate can be measured by the application of a max-flow algorithm
to the network. Based on this analogy, the weight of a minimum-cut represents the
maximum possible capacity for such network. A minimum-cut is a minimal set of
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the network edges that if removed, the network source disconnects from the network
sink. The weight associated with each edge represents how many bits of information
the edge carries.
3.1.1 Constructing the Network of Flow
Here we describe how to build a network of flow representing possible information
streams corresponding to an execution of a program [75]. The flow graph consists of
nodes representing operations and edges representing values. Each edge has a capacity
equal to the bits of data it can hold. Edges are directed and for each node, the ingress
edges are the operands of the node’s operation and there is a single egress edge for
each node associated with the result of the operation. Load and store operations
are broken into bytes. The generated flow graph is directed and acyclic with edges
pointing from older nodes to newer ones in terms of the execution sequence. The
secret inputs are represented by a source node and all public outputs are represented
by a sink node.
In an execution, along with direct data flows corresponding to the explicit oper-
ations on the data, there exist implicit data flows as well. Implicit data flows are
associated to operations like branch, pointer, and array that are affected by secret
data. Such operations affect control flow or the operands of other operations based
on the secret data value. For example a two-way conditional branch on a secret value,
can reveal 1 bit of information about the secret value. Therefore, a sound flow net-
work should account for implicit flows as well. FlowCheck assumes an execution as an
enclosed computation with determined inputs and outputs. Then for each identified
implicit flow, an edge connects the implicit operation to the outputs. By default, the
program outputs are the receiver of the implicit edges, but an special annotation can
be used at the source level to define more precise computation units with determined
outputs. Such annotation (named enclosure region) helps with the precision of the
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calculated information flow at the end. The capacity associated with the implicit
flow edges is determined by the number of different executions for that operation.
For example for a two-way branch on the secret data, the capacity will be one bit,
while for a pointer operation like indirect memory access or jump, the capacity will
be equal to the number of secret bits in the pointer.
Each edge in the constructed flow network is weighted. The weight or capacity of
an edge represents the maximum amount of information carried by that edge. The
capacity for direct flow edges are computed using bit-level dynamic taint analysis. For
each memory location and registers in the program execution context, a shadow bit
vector is maintained to mark which bits are secret. These marked bits are calculated
based on bit-level taint rules for basic operations. Then, the number of secret bits
determines the capacity of the associated edge in the network.
3.1.2 Calculating the Maximum Flow
Once FlowCheck constructs the flow network, calculating the maximum possible in-
formation flow from the secret inputs to the outputs is straightforward. Based on
the max-flow min-cut theorem, the maximum capacity transferable from the network
source to the sink is the capacity of a minimum cut. A minimum cut is a set of
edges that if removed, disconnect the network source and sink. The weight of the
minimum cut is the sum of the capacity of edges in such set. This value represents
a conservative estimation of information leaking from the secret input to the public
output.
3.2 Symbolic Execution for Better Precision
Even though FlowCheck accounts for implicit flows and employs bit-level taint anal-
ysis, in some scenarios it still unnecessarily overestimates the information flow. For
3.2. Symbolic Execution for Better Precision 18
1 if (i < 16)
2 v = base + i;
3 else
4 v = base;
Figure 3.1: An example of overestimation by FlowCheck
example, in the code snippet in Figure 3.1, assuming the type of the variables to
be unsigned 32-bit integer, the total information flow form the secret variable i to
the output v is 4 bits. That is because the check at line 1, limits the influence of
the secret value i: for any possible values of i, the value of v will be in the range of
[base, base+15], which means quantitative influence is 4 bits. This is while FlowCheck
reports 32 bits as dynamic taint analysis marks v as tainted when the check at line 1
passes.
We can do better by calculating the actual control that an input has over the
output. Newsome et al. [77] proposed the notion of influence to measure such control
to detect integrity policy violations. In a deterministic computation, the influence of
the computation input over the output is log2 of number of possible output values.
We can see that the influence of i over v in Figure 3.1 is 4 bits.
To measure the influence of a computation we can use symbolic execution to
formulate the computation’s output as a function on its inputs. In this way, the com-
putation execution paths are expressed as SMT formulas over bit-vectors. Generally
such formulas are passed to a SMT solver, where the solver checks for satisfiability.
But in our case we need to determine the number of possible output values, so we
use model counting. Model counting techniques are used for enumerating the number
of satisfying assignment for a given formula. This makes it suitable for quantitative
information analysis, and more specifically in our case: influence measurement. This
way, for a given execution region, we measure the input influence by counting the
number of distinct output values by varying the input bits.
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To improve the precision of dynamic taint tracking, we employ Fuzzball [74, 38]
as our symbolic execution engine, and SearchMC [58] for model counting. FuzzBALL
is a binary symbolic execution tool which uses Vine library from the BitBlaze frame-
work [95] to lift the binary and instrument it. SearchMC is an approximate model
counting tool that uses statistical estimation to compute a model count of a SMT
formula. As it measures influence on a statistical estimate, it may return a fractional
result for a formula, which we round it up, and then use it in our information flow
analysis. This round-up is most cases compensates for the randomness of SearchMC.
For a detailed analysis of confidence in SearchMC result we refer the reader to [58].
For a given execution region, the symbolic execution engine extracts SMT formulas
and passes them to the model counter and then, we use the measured influence to
refine overall information flow. The main idea is finding regions of execution that
influence measurement can give us more precise estimate on information flow and
then use this estimate to replace the one of taint analysis. We need to select the
regions in a way that symbolic execution can compute in a reasonable time. This
method is still a sound information flow analysis as the symbolic execution step
explores all execution paths of the region, therefore the influence measurement is still
an overestimate of the information flow (within a confidence interval as an argument
to the model counter), but a tighter one.
Once the symbolic execution calculates the influence for a given region, we update
the flow network with the influence measured for the region. We call this process
surgery. The surgery replaces the sub-graph representing the region with an edge
from the region’s inputs to the region’s output. The replacement edge’s weight is
the measured influence via model counting. Re-evaluating minimum cut, will reflect
the influence measurement in overall information flow analysis of the program. For
example, the sub-graph representing the code in Figure 3.1 will be replaced with an
edge from the i to v with a weight of 4. Re-evaluating minimum cut reflects this new
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measurement in the overall flow estimate.
3.2.1 Internals of FCFB
We named our hybrid quantitative information analysis tool FCFB as a concatena-
tion of the abbreviated names of two existing tools we are using: FlowCheck and
FuzzBALL.
As preprocessing step, given a subject binary for analysis, we statically extract
the call graph, function boundaries, and control-flow graph of each function. Addi-
tionally, for each basic block, we identify pre-dominator and post-dominator. For the
preprocessing steps we developed an static tool using DyninstAPI [11]. DyninstAPI
provides interfaces for platform independent binary analysis and transformation.
We then run the subject binary under FlowCheck. This run creates the initial
data flow graph based on the notion of network capacity and gives us the min-cut.
We model an execution point as a pair of an instruction address and instruction
count. The second element of the pair is a count of executions for the first element.
This way we can differentiate between multiple execution of a single instruction (like
in a loop). This pair helps to pinpoint same point of execution which is impor-
tant to transfer between FlowCheck (data flow analysis) and FuzzBALL (symbolic
execution). Therefore the identified min-cut location is a set of pairs of the form
(mc addr, mc count). Using this set we extract an snapshot of whole execution at
the point of min-cut. Meaning that we create an snapshot of instruction counts at
the point of min-cut. These information is used when passing a region to FuzzBALL
for influence measurement.
The initial region that can be considered for influence measurement using sym-
bolic execution, is the smallest region covering all cut edges. For a simple case where
the min-cut consists of a single edge, the basic block containing mc addr will be the
starting region. Meaning that the region of code to be passed to FuzzBALL will start
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at the first instruction of the basic block and end at the last instruction of the basic
block. Using the instruction count snapshot maintained at (mc addr, mc count),
we can identify the instruction count for these start and end addresses. There-
fore, the influence measurement starts at (start addr, start count) and finishes
at (end addr, end count).
Next, we have to identify the inputs to the region and outputs from the region.
The input to the region are the tainted data at (start addr, start count). The
output from the region are the newly tainted data at (end addr, end count). We
implemented new features in FlowCheck to extract tainted data at any execution
point. Therefore, we once extract tainted data at (start addr, start count) call-
ing it set T1, and once extract tainted data at (end addr, end count) calling it set
T2. T1 is the input data to the region, and the output from the region is T2 \ T1.
Now that we have the execution region along with the input to and output from the
region, we go ahead and issue an influence measurement query to the FuzzBALL. This
query starts at (start addr, start count) and ends at (end addr, end count),
while marking memory regions or registers in T1 as symbolic. It measures the influ-
ence of those symbolic inputs on the data in T2 \ T1.
Once FuzzBALL finishes, FCFB extracts the measured influence and performs
surgery. As described before, surgery updates the network capacity graph by replacing
the subgraph associated to the execution region with an edge from the region’s inputs
to the outputs. The surgery edge is labeled with a weight of measured influence.
Then we feed this updated network capacity graph to the max-flow algorithm. The
newly calculated max-flow reflects the effect of influence measurement for the chosen
execution region.
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3.2.2 Region Exploration
FCFB uses min-cut as a hint to start off from an interesting execution point. The
min-cut is interesting as it is somehow the bottleneck of the network capacity graph
and it pertains the critical data dependency between program input and the output.
In Section 3.2.1 we started from the basic block containing the min-cut. It will
be more fruitful if we can expand the region and cover more execution area. But
it is not practical to expand the region in a way that covers the whole program.
That is because influence measurement is very expensive inherently because of the
underlying symbolic execution and model counting. We can expand the region by
multiple step sizes. For example, the start address can be set to the previous basic
block in the CFG. Same for the end address, which can be set to the next basic block
in the CFG. Because a basic block may have multiple immediate predecessors and
successors, using pre-dominator and post-dominator is a more consistent approach.
Additionally, combinations of start and end exploration can be employed.
As described in Section 3.2.1, the initial code region passed to FuzzBALL is derived
based on the min-cut. The code region should respect the invariant that the start
point precedes the end point, otherwise the symbolic execution fails. When expanding
current region, we have to guarantee that this invariant holds for all the candidate
regions. One possible approach is incorporating pre- and post-dominator relationship
for the current function’s CFG. This becomes challenging when the region expands
beyond function calls. Therefore, in pre-processing phase we extract the chronological
ordering of the execution addresses along with their execution count. We do this
by instrumenting FlowCheck to dump current instruction address and count when
generating the initial data flow graph. Recall that we model an execution point
as a pair of address and count. So, the chronological execution dump gives us all
execution points of the subject binary on the given inputs. The code region used for
symbolic execution can be mapped to the execution points in the chronological dump.
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(i− ss, j + ss) (i, j + ss) (i+ ss, j + ss)
(i− ss, j) (i, j) (i+ ss, j)
(i− ss, j − ss) (i, j − ss) (i+ ss, j − ss)
Table 3.1: Neighbor regions of (i, j) with a step size of ss
Therefore, the invariant check is reduced to comparing the indexes of start and end
execution points in the dump. As long as the start index is less than the end index,
the invariant holds.
A given region is represented as a pair of (start index, end index) correspond-
ing to their indexes in the chronological execution dump. Assuming an step size of
ss, we can generated a set of 8 neighbors for a given region, as shown in Table 3.1.
Therefore, our exploration space can be represented by the upper triangle of the
matrix of start and end indexes. This means we have a discrete search space. A region
passed to FuzzBALL may either produce an influence measurement or fail to do so
(e.g due to timeout). As a result, we cannot make any assumption on monotonicity
of the calculations.
These all suggest that we have a discrete non-convex optimization problem to
find the best region to minimize the overall data flow analysis. Greedy approaches
like gradient descent [81, 89] that only select a neighbor with better result for the
current state may end up in local optima. Instead, we adapt an approach based on
Simulated Annealing [60, 29] to search the regions. Simulated Annealing is an iterative
probabilistic local search algorithm for finding a global minimum. The naming comes
from an analogy in thermodynamics were a crystalline solid is heated first and then
left to cool down slowly to reach its regular crystal lattice. As the solid cools down the
crystals movement decrease in a way that eventually it ends up with no crystal defect.
The main advantage of Simulated annealing over techniques like gradient descent
is its ability to escape local minimums by moving uphill with a probability [47].
In a discrete optimization problem, each iteration of Simulated Annealing consists
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Algorithm 1: Simulated Annealing Algorithm for Region Exploration
Initialization: Specify (Ω, f, N), an initial state w ∈ Ω, a temperature
parameter tk, k = 0, 1, ...
while Stopping criterion not met do
Generate a neighbor w′ ∈ N(w)
Calculate ∆w,w′ ← f(w′)− f(w)
if ∆w,w′ ≤ 0 then
w ← w′
else
Generate a random number u ∼ U(0, 1)




k ← k + 1
end
evaluating the objective function of a neighbor and comparing it against the current
state. If the neighbor generates an improved solution, it is taken unconditionally. A
non-improving neighbor can also be chosen based on a probability function. Such non-
improving steps are performed to escape local optimum solutions. The probability
function to accept a non-improving solution depends on the current temperature.
As the algorithm iterates, the temperature decreases and as a result non-improving
solutions are chosen less frequently. Multiple research [29, 50, 47, 34, 61] have covered
the theoretical aspects and applicability of Simulated Annealing which are out of the
scope of this thesis.
Algorithm 1 depicts the adapted Simulated Annealing from [50] that we are using
for our region exploration problem to find optimal data flow estimate. To describe
the algorithm, we provide the following definitions:
• Set of all possible states Ω: Each state is in the form of (start index,
end index) corresponding to the indexes in execution dump.
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• Objective function f : Let f : Ω → R, the goal is finding a global minimum
w∗ ∈ Ω, such that f(w) ≥ f(w∗) for all w ∈ Ω. The objective function must
be bounded to ensure such global minimum exists. For each state, we run
FuzzBALL on it and produce a final flow estimate. This estimate is bounded
in the range of zero and original FlowCheck estimate.
• Neighborhood function N : The neighboring function takes current state w
as input and returns one of its possible neighbors randomly.
The initial state w is generated based on the min-cut. The temperature param-
eter tk decreases as k increases. We chose a linear decrease of temperature at each
iteration. At each state, we take a neighbor uniformly from the set of all possible
neighbors for w and use it for influence measurement using FuzzBALL. The calculated
influence is then used to estimate a new flow value. If this estimate is improving the
overall measurement, the the neighbor is selected for the next iteration. Otherwise,
it is selected with probability of exp(−∆w,w′/tk). As tk decreases, such probability
decreases, too. Therefore, non-improving neighbors are selected less frequently. For
the stopping criterion we use a timeout threshold of 2 hours.
3.3 Case Studies
In this section, we evaluate our proposed hybrid method by applying it to three use
cases: character counting, image transformation, and checksum calculation.
3.3.1 Count Vowels Binary
Assume a scenario where you have a program in binary format which returns the
ratio of vowel characters in an input text file. If the input text file contains sensitive
information, we do not want the amount of information leaked by the program surpass
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1 int num_letters = 0;
2 int num_vowels = 0;
3 int bar_len;
4 ...
5 while (( num_read = fread(buf , 1, 4096, fh))) {
6 count_vowels(buf , num_read);
7 total_read += num_read;
8 }
9
10 if (num_letters == 0) {
11 bar_len = 0;
12 } else if (num_vowels > num_letters){
13 bar_len = 70;
14 }
15 else {
16 bar_len = (70 * num_vowels) / num_letters;
17 }
18
19 for (i = 0; i < bar_len; i++) {
20 print_buf[i] = ’#’;
21 }
22 ...
Figure 3.2: Main Part of Count Vowel Code
a security threshold. For this reason we apply our quantitative information flow
analysis on the Count Vowels Binary (CVB) to measure the amount of information
leaked by the CVB’s output.
Figure 3.2 shows the main part of CVB source code. The while loop at line 5
reads the contents of the input file and calls count vowels() on the read buffer. This
function checks each character in the buffer and counts the number of observed vowel
characters and total characters by updating two global variables: num vowels and
num letters. CVB asserts that these two variables are always non-negative. The
code then calculates a bar len using the two global variables, to represent the ratio
of vowel characters in the input text (lines 10 through 17). This bar len variable
determines the number of # characters to be placed in the print buf which later will
be displayed to the user.
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Figure 3.3: FCFB region exploration for CVB
The public output of CVB is the print buf array. Which its number of elements
is bounded by bar len variable. bar len, in turn is being calculated based on two
variables num vowels and num letters which are based on the secret input file con-
tents. Assuming that the bar len variable can fit in a 32-bit signed integer, we can
say that the maximum information leak cannot be more than 32 bits. A closer look
into the calculation of the bar len can give us a tighter bound. Lines 10 through
17 confirms that the value of bar len will be in the range of [0, 70]. In other terms,
the number of # printed is bounded in the range [0, 70] which is about 7 bits of
information. In the code presented in Figure 3.2 we left out the details on how to
enclose implicit data flows. In the actual code to be run under FlowCheck, we use
an enclosure region starting at line 9 and ending at line 18 with the specific output
of bar len to account for the implicit data flow of the if-else clause on bar len.
More details on enclosure regions is provided in [75].
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1 uint8_t *fileContent;
2 uint16_t *alphaBuf;
3 int i, percent = 90;
4 ...
5 for (i = imageBodyIndex , j = 0; i < fileSize; i += 3, j++){
6 r = fileContent[i];
7 g = fileContent[i+1];
8 b = fileContent[i+2];
9 gray = (299*r + 587*g + 114*b)/1000;
10 alphaBuf[i] = 257 * ((r*(100 - percent) + gray*percent)/100);
11 alphaBuf[i+1] = 257 * ((g*(100 - percent) + gray*percent)/100);
12 alphaBuf[i+2] = 257 * ((b*(100 - percent) + gray*percent)/100);
13 }
14 ...
Figure 3.4: Main Part of De-saturate Transform Code
Running CVB on its source code under FlowCheck reports 24 bits of information
leak. This is while our hybrid method can identify the tighter range of values for
bar len and reports 7 bits of information leak.
Figure 3.3 shows the progress of FCFB region exploration for our experiment. The
X axis is start index in the execution dump, and Y axis is the end index. Each dot
on in the graph represents a region, which is used for influence measurement. The
color-bar to the right, shows the the improvement of the result; the greener, the more
improvement in terms of information leak estimate. The exploration started from the
diamond, and eventually reached the best answer of 7. The best region for the CVB
was a region covering lines 10 through 17 in the code of Figure 3.2. For this region,
the secret inputs are num letters and num vowels and the output is bar len. The
symbolic execution measure an influence of 6.4977 bits from the region inputs to the
output and the final max-flow measurement reports 7 bits of information leak.
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3.3.2 De-saturate Image Transformation Binary
As another case study, we apply our hybrid method on an image transformation
binary. Here, the code reads in a RGB image in PPM format, and for each pixel
de-saturates it by eliminating hue and saturation information while retaining the
luminance. Figure 3.4 shows the main part of this transformation.
The for loop at line 5 iterates over each pixel and calculates a gray value, then the
output pixel is derived as a weighted sum of the input R/G/B with the calculated
gray value. The gray value calculation at line 9 is based on the formula used by
rgb2gray function in MATLAB [87]. In our experiment we used 90 for the value of
percent. To calculate the actual information leak, we need to look into the internals
of the PPM format and the way the output pixel values are calculated.
Portable PixMap (PPM) image format is encoded in human-readable text [83].
Figure 3.5 shows the contents of the input image we used for our case study. Lines
1-3 are the image header that provides an overview of the rest of the image. The
header consists of four entries in the same layout shown in lines 1-3. The first line
determines the image format (P3). It says this file is a full-color, ASCII text encoded
PPM image. Line 2, determines the number of columns and rows in the image. So,
the example is a 2 pixel by 3 pixel image. Line 3 is called maximum color value,
which determines the range of values used for color intensity. Commonly, 255 is used
as maximum color value and it means that for each pixel, the value of red, green, or
blue can range from 0 up to 255. Lines 4 through 6 contain the image body. Each
pixel is represented with triple value determining the intensity of red, green, and blue.
So, a pixel with values of 0 0 0 will be black, and with values of 255 255 255 will be
white.
Running de-saturate code with the input image, under FlowCheck gives an upper
bound of 168 bits of information leak. This is while the information leak reported
by our hybrid approach is 152. To evaluate the actual information flow in the de-




4 104 113 143 48 61 93
5 168 152 157 67 70 89
6 55 92 176 22 37 73
Figure 3.5: Input PPM Image
saturate binary, we have to account that 24 bits of information associated with the
header of the ppm file is copied to the output directly. The amount of information
transferred to the output pixel varies depending on the percent value. For example,
for the case of percent = 0 all of 3 × 8 = 24 bits are copied to the output. For our
case, where percent = 90 we calculated the influence empirically: for each value of
red/green/blue we have 256 different values therefore we could apply the computation
shown in Figure 3.4 with all possible values for r, g, and b as input to generate
the new red/green/blue value. We then count the number of set bits in a matrix
of 3 × 256. This way we derived the influence of input pixel on the output pixel
to be: log2 179836 = 17.456322. As a result, the actual information leak will be
24 + 6 ∗ 17.456322 = 128.737932. Figure 3.6 shows the progress of FCFB region
exploration for our experiment. The exploration started from the blue diamond,
and eventually reached the best answer of 152. The best region found by FCFB for
this binary were equivalent to the code of line 9 through 12 in Figure 3.4 where it
calculated an influence of 8.5329 bits from the region secret inputs to the output.
3.3.3 cksum Binary (coreutils)
cksum is a program in coreutils that takes an input file and prints the CRC-32 check-
sum of the file contents along with its byte counts and the file name. Cyclic Re-
dundancy Codes (CRC), is one of the most common error-detection techniques used
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Figure 3.6: FCFB region exploration for de-saturate binary
both in software and hardware. The basic idea behind CRC algorithm is to treat a
message as a binary number and to divide it by another fixed binary number. The
division’s remainder is the checksum that can be used for integrity check [100]. De-
tailed description of CRC implementations can be found in [82, 100]. It is now well
known that CRC is not secure to use in adversarial contexts [8, 37].
In general hash functions and in some cases specifically CRC functions are pre-
sented as examples of functionalities that are hard to symbolically execute [12, 41, 51].
Sharma et al. [94] have shown that CRC calculation may not impede symbolic execu-
tion if some clever optimizations are employed. For our experiments in this section, we
have used theory-of-arrays-table optimization to create formulas reflecting contents
of the underlying lookup table. That is because as shown in [94], this optimization
works the best for CRC-32 with shorter symbolic inputs.
cksum uses the table-driven implementation of CRC. Such implementation is faster
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1 while (( bytes_read = fread (buf , 1, BUFLEN , fp)) > 0)
2 {
3 unsigned char *cp = buf;
4
5 length += bytes_read;
6
7 while (bytes_read --)
8 crc = (crc << 8) ^ crctab [((crc >> 24) ^ *cp++) & 0xFF];
9 }
10
11 crc = ~crc & 0xFFFFFFFF;
Figure 3.7: Main Part of CRC-32 computation of cksum
as it uses a lookup table to retrieve pre-computed values for a given byte. Figure 3.7
shows the main part of the underlying code used in cksum for CRC-32 calculation.
In each iteration of the while loop at line 1, the input is read into the buffer.
In the while loop at line 7, for each byte in the buffer, based on the content of the
buffer, a pre-computed value is loaded from the table crctab, and XOR’d with the
running CRC value. At the end, the bit sequence is complemented for the final CRC.
A detailed explanation of this table-driven implementation can be found in [100].
We ran the cksum under FlowCheck and FCFB using a test input file of size 1983
bytes. The FlowCheck reported 73 bits of information leak, while FCFB reported 59
bits of information leak. To evaluate the actual information flow in cksum binary,
we have to notice that the bit masking at line 11 of the code in Figure 3.7 ensures
that the crc variable cannot carry more than 32 bits of the secret information from
the input file. cksum also prints the byte counts of the input file. The amount of
information leak as a result of byte length printing cannot be more than 21 bits.
That is because each digit printing leaks log2 10 = 3.3219 and our test input has 4
digits length size. Additionally, the string format of length1 variable leaks at most
5 bits. Therefore, the overall information leak of cksum binary for our test input
1length is of type uintmax t which is 64-bit long on our test system.
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Figure 3.8: FCFB region exploration for cksum binary
is 32 + 4 ∗ 3.3219 + 5 = 50.2876. Figure 3.8 shows the progress of FCFB region
exploration for our experiment. The exploration starting from the blue diamond,
eventually reached the best answer of 59. The best region found by FCFB corresponds
to the code lines 7 and 8 in Figure 3.7, where it calculated an influence of 20.9917
bits from the secret file contents to the crc variable.
Chapter 4
Static Vulnerability Detection
In this chapter we present a static vulnerability detection system that incorporates
multiple data-flow-based analyses to detect resource leak bugs in operating system
code. Our proposed system first identifies memory allocation functions, then goes
for identifying associated deallocation functions. This pairing is important as the
memory allocated through an allocating function should be released via an appro-
priate deallocation function. Then, our system incorporates an ownership reasoning
technique to determine where in the code the allocated memory is supposed to be
released. Missing a release function in such locations indicates a resource leaking
bug. We also enhance the vulnerability detection with under-constrained symbolic
execution to distinct false positives from true vulnerabilities.
Portions of this chapter draw on work previously published in the proceedings of
the Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS) 2021 [30].
4.1 A Study of Kernel Memory Allocation
In this section, we take a look at the dynamic memory allocation mechanism in a
kernel (using the Linux kernel for concreteness).
Types of memory allocation. Dynamic memory allocation in the kernel is not as
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straightforward as in user-space. The complication comes mainly from the fact that
the kernel has much less physical memory available—generally kernel memory is not
pageable, and often the allocation is required to be a physically continuous memory
region and sometimes in specific address ranges. The kernel allocation sometimes
needs to be atomic i.e. it should not sleep. Such delicacies make any mistake in
kernel allocation have a higher impact on the whole system’s stability.
OS kernels typically allocate only a relatively small stack per thread.1 This limi-
tation requires kernel developers to avoid allocating large structures on the stack but
instead, to perform more heap-based allocation. kmalloc() is the general-purpose
allocation interface in the kernel. It takes two arguments: size and flags. Like
user-space malloc(), size specifies the allocation size in bytes. The flags argument
controls the behavior of the allocation. On success kmalloc() returns a pointer to
the memory of size bytes, while in case of failure a NULL pointer is returned. The
flags parameter in kmalloc() tells the kernel how or where to perform the allocation.
As an example, the flag GFP ATOMIC instructs the memory allocator never to block,
i.e., it cannot go to sleep to free up the required memory. This is appropriate when the
code holds a lock, or in interrupt handlers. On the other hand, the flag, GFP KERNEL,
indicates the normal kernel allocation which may go to sleep. As another example,
flag GFP DMA instructs the memory allocator to allocate from the physical address
range which is accessible by the hardware through direct memory access. The header
<linux/gfp.h> defines all the allocation flags.
kmalloc() returns physically continuous memory. Such an allocation has two
main advantages over virtual memory allocations. First, it can be used by the hard-
ware as non-CPU devices use physical addressing. Second, physically continuous
memory can be allocated within a single large page and as a result, be faster from
1On Linux, kernel thread stacks vary by architecture, but are commonly 1, 2, or 4 pages, so
4–16KiB.
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memory translation perspective. However, allocation via kmalloc() has a higher
chance of failure for large sizes. Therefore if there is no need for physically continu-
ous memory, or if the allocation size is large, vmalloc() should be used. vmalloc()
uses page table manipulation to create a virtually continuous memory region. It also
may block when allocating, and therefore cannot be used in an interrupt handler.
To avoid memory fragmentation, especially when many identical objects should be
allocated, a slab cache can be used [7]. The cache is set up via kmem cache create()
and the allocation from the cache is realized via kmem cache alloc(). For example,
Linux maintains separate caches for inode, dentries, and buffer heads [57].
The dynamically allocated memory should be explicitly released when it has no
further usage. Otherwise, the memory is leaked and eventually, no further allocation
will be possible. The allocations via kmalloc() should be released via kfree() which
takes the pointer to the memory to be released and returns the memory to the kernel.
Allocations via vmalloc() should be released by vfree(), and slab cache allocations
via kmem cache free().
Specialized allocation. Various kernel modules have their own specialized alloca-
tors. Such allocators are responsible to allocate and sometimes initialize a specialized
structure. The memory allocation is usually realized via a more primitive allocator,
and after some initialization or extra operations, a pointer is returned to the caller.
Such allocations require a specialized release and are not deallocated just by kfree().
For example, the netlink2 module uses nlmsg new() to allocate a new message and
uses nlmsg free() to release such message. Such specialization particularly imposes
challenges to the detection of memory leaks because the detection must identify allo-
cators and the corresponding deallocators.
2include/net/netlink.h
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4.2 Memory Leak
An operating system (OS) kernel is part of the trusted computing base (TCB) in
most modern software systems. Vulnerabilities in the OS kernel allow an adversary
to bypass security measures and compromise the whole system. Much of the research
in the security community has focused on memory-corruption bugs in the kernel [40,
69, 49, 101, 103]. At the same time resource exhaustion vulnerabilities in the kernel
have been subject to less attention, though they too can have severe consequences
on system stability and availability [18, 79, 76]. Based on our study, we found out
that just 17 CVEs were assigned to Linux kernel memory leak bugs. 10 of these
vulnerabilities were discovered in the past two years.
Memory is a primary resource available to a kernel, and it may be exhausted by
memory leak vulnerabilities. A memory leak happens when an allocated memory
region is not released even though it will never be used again. A memory region is
definitely leaked when all the pointers to the allocated memory go out of scope or
are overwritten. Leaked memory becomes unusable until the system reboots. Kernel
memory is typically never swapped out, so a kernel memory leak reduces the physical
memory available for any other purpose. Due to increased paging, a memory leak
can hurt performance [33] and eventually exhaust all the available memory. Kernel
memory leaks happen mostly on error-handling paths mainly because such paths are
less exercised during tests. If a path associated with a memory leak gets executed fre-
quently, the triggered memory leak eventually causes a denial of service. Furthermore,
many small or infrequent memory leak bugs may lead to the same situation [16, 23].
Of course, even if a memory leak occurs only very rarely in normal operation of a
system, a malicious user may find a way to trigger a leak with high frequency.
For example, Figure 4.1 depicts a memory leak bug that was discovered by our
tool which was assigned CVE-2019-19062. Here the function crypto report() at line
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1 /* File: crypto/crypto_user_base.c */
2 static int crypto_report(struct sk_buff *in_skb ,
3 struct nlmsghdr *in_nlh , struct nlattr ** attrs)
4 {
5 struct crypto_dump_info info;
6 ...




11 err = -ENOMEM;
12 /* Memory is allocated here */




17 info.out_skb = skb;
18 ...






25 return err; /* Memory leaks here */
26 ...
27 }
Figure 4.1: A new memory leak bug (CVE-2019-19062) detected by K-MeLD: the
path ending at line 25 needs to release skb.
13 allocates the memory via nlmsg new() for a netlink message. A pointer to this
message is stored in skb. The code at line 14 checks whether the allocation succeeded
or not. If the allocation was not successful, execution returns at line 15. If the
allocation was successful, the execution continues up to the line 19, where function
crypto report alg() is called. The status of the call to crypto report alg() is
checked at line 24. If it was successful, the skb is consumed in lines after 26, but
if crypto report alg() fails, the function returns at line 25 without releasing skb,
which is a memory leak.
Challenges. Two key challenges exist in static memory leak detection for an OS
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kernel. (1) Specialized functions. Monolithic OS kernels like the Linux kernel tend to
contain tens of thousands of different modules developed by numerous vendors and
programmers. We consider a function as specialized if it is developed for a specific
module to perform a customized flavor of generic operation (like allocation/dealloca-
tion of a network buffer). As a result, an OS kernel has a large number of specialized
functions for memory allocation and deallocation. An effective detection requires
identifying such specialized allocation functions and the corresponding deallocation
functions. While there are only a handful of commonly used allocation functions, our
tool found more than 800 specialized ones.
(2) Complicated and lengthy data flow. A memory leak occurs when a memory
object is not released at the end of the object life-cycle. In other words, an effective
detection often has to analyze a lengthy data flow—from allocation to the end of life-
cycle. More importantly, the lengthy data flow can be highly complicated in an OS
kernel: Pointers to an allocated memory object are also often copied between different
data structures across functions. An effective detection must determine which location
or function is responsible to release the memory object3. We say a memory pointer
is an escaping pointer if it is passed to the caller of the current function and thus
can be freed outside the scope of the current code. A consumer function, on the
other hand is a callee of current function that takes the ownership of the memory
object, therefore the current function should not try to release after returning from
the consumer function. An analysis needs to accurately recognize escaping pointers
and consumer functions to avoid false-positive memory leak reports.
Given the challenges for static leak detection in an OS kernel, one may wonder
if a dynamic approach would yield better results. We argue that a static detection
works better because there is no need to provide real or synthetic inputs to trigger
3Incorrectly placed releases introduce severe memory corruption bugs like use-after-free or double-
free.
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all potential execution paths. Moreover, for specialized drivers, the specific hardware
should be available to be able to exercise the driver code. Because of such inherent
code coverage shortcomings of dynamic approaches, we opt for a static leak detection
approach.
Researchers have attempted to statically detect kernel memory leaks; but their
techniques have important limitations. In particular, general bug finding tools like
Coccinelle [80] have limited effectiveness for detecting kernel memory leaks. Coccinelle
does not implement any specific bug-finding policy but allows specifying patterns to
search for potentially faulty code blocks in a function’s CFG. For example, to find
a memory leak a general pattern could be like: any allocation function should be
followed by a deallocation. Such a high-level pattern yields a high rate of false positive.
Because of the cost of manual rule specification, these tools have been applied just to
general purpose allocation functions that have well-known deallocation counterparts
(like kmalloc-kfree).
In addition, previously proposed systems that detect resource release bugs [102, 90]
either lack support for specialized allocations, or fail to effectively handle escaping
pointers and consumer functions.
In this chapter, we introduce K-MeLD (Kernel Memory Leak Detector), a static
analysis tool, to detect kernel memory leaks. K-MeLD not only identifies specialized
allocation functions and the corresponding deallocation functions, but also answers
where an object is supposed to be released by handling the complicated and lengthy
data flow. K-MeLD features multiple new techniques. First, K-MeLD identifies
specialized allocation functions by using a usage-driven and structure-aware analysis,
then uses a context-aware and path-sensitive mining technique to detect correspond-
ing release functions. More specifically, the initial set of allocation functions are
populated based on the type and uses of the return value and the way such value is
derived. Then, assuming the faulty dynamic allocation managements are outliers [31],
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the high-level intuition is modeling the common approach of memory releasing to ef-
fectively identify memory release operations even in specialized cases. In a big corpus
of code like a kernel4, there are many potentially long execution paths. It has been
shown that error-handling paths get less of testing and coding review [3, 71]. Based
on our observation from manually checking the sites of memory mismanagement bugs,
error-handling codes were where we could spot the bugs. In addition, error-handling
code are usually shorter than normal execution paths and are intended to restore
the state of system from an error. That means we can expect to find the release
functions in error-handling paths if the function is supposed to release memory. The
number of correctly implemented error-handling paths is much more than erroneous
ones. Therefore, modeling the common behavior of error-handling paths enables us
to single out potentially buggy implementations.
Second, we develop an ownership reasoning mechanism to infer the release loca-
tions. K-MeLD first uses enhanced escape analysis to determine when the ownership
of an allocated object is transferred. We observed that kernels typically follow an in-
formal discipline of “ownership” of dynamically allocated data (related to the concept
codified in languages like Rust, but without type-system support). A function that
allocates a memory object will either be responsible for deallocating that object itself,
or if the object is made available to the caller via a return value or a pointer, the
calling function also takes the responsibility to deallocate the object. Based on this
pattern, our tool can avoid false positives by determining when objects can escape
to a calling function: we do not expect a function to deallocate an object on a path
where the object escapes. In such scenarios, the calling function is responsible to
appropriately manage the allocated memory object. On the other hand, the allocat-
ing function may also pass a memory object down the call-graph to a callee, thus it
is important to have an inter-procedural analysis to determine how the callee treats
4For example the Linux kernel is over 27 millions of lines of code.
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the memory object. We call a function a consumer if it releases the received mem-
ory object or transfers its ownership on all or some of its execution paths. This is
important because once returning from the callee, the allocating function should not
try to release the memory object if already released. The analysis requires to handle
conditional consumers as well. These are functions that consume the memory object
under certain conditions: consider a socket packet-send function that consumes the
allocated socket buffer only in the case of a successful send. In such case, the caller
of packet-send has to release the buffer if sending fails. K-MeLD employs an inter-
procedural path-sensitive analysis to track memory object propagation and identify
consumer functions.
We implemented our tool as multiple LLVM passes, rule mining, and rule applica-
tion. We conservatively identified more than 800 memory allocation functions, most
of which are specialized ones, and the associated release functions. After the owner-
ship reasoning via inter-procedural analyses, and rule application, we detect 218 new
memory leaks bugs even in many specialized modules. Our evaluation also confirmed
that our ownership reasoning mechanisms significantly improves the accuracy.
4.3 Overview of K-MeLD
The goal of K-MeLD is to thoroughly and precisely detect memory leak bugs in
kernel code. To identify a memory leak bug in a function, we model a memory leak
as a case satisfying the following conditions:
1. A function retains ownership of the allocated memory
2. The function finishes without releasing the allocated memory
Originally, the allocating function is the owner of the memory object. However, the
ownership of the object would likely propagate to other functions, e.g., the pointer to





























Figure 4.2: Overview of K-MeLD. Identifying specialized allocation functions and
the corresponding deallocatoin is followed by inter-procedural escape and consumer
function analysis to determine the ownership of each allocation. Rule application
checks the presence of deallocation and reports the bugs.
the memory object is passed to other functions (e.g. via return or parameters). As
long as a function owns the memory region, the function is supposed to release the
memory region; failure to do so is a memory leak. According to the modeling, we
structure K-MeLD into four phases, as shown in Figure 4.2: allocation/deallocation
identification, ownership propagation analysis, and missing deallocation detection.
As shown in Figure 4.2, K-MeLD compiles the source code into LLVM IR bitcode
files. Such bitcode files are first preprocessed to extract contextual and structural
properties. More specifically, we collect return type, argument signature, definition
and usages of functions. At multiple points of our analyses, a call graph is used to
identify the set of callees or callers for each function. Therefore in the preprocessing
step, the global call graph is constructed via maintaining a map of function and all
of its callees. To resolve indirect calls, we use function signatures to match the target
function from among functions whose address is taken. The preprocessing phase is
performed once.
Phase 1: allocation/deallocation identification. We identify potential allo-
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cation functions by looking for pointer-returning functions that are followed by a
null-check on the returned pointer. Additionally, we prune any function that is off-
setting the returning pointer from an arguments. We also track the usage of the
returned pointer to determine initialization before being de-referenced. Once the al-
location functions are identified, deallocation functions are identified via rule mining.
We refer to the current allocation function as the “function of interest” (FOI), while
the function that calls the FOI is the “allocating function.”
The high-level rationale behind using rule mining is that assuming the correct
behavior is prevalent in a big code base like the OS kernel, we can model such common
behavior in the form of sequential patterns. Rule mining uses sequential pattern
discovery techniques to identify the sequence of commonly used operations on the
memory object. This way for a specific FOI we can identify the common sequence
of operations that are used for deallocation. For example, considering kmalloc as
FOI, by looking through error handling paths of kmalloc call-sites we can observe the
function kfree is called in most cases before terminating the execution path. Thus
one can conclude that kfree is the associated deallocation function.
Phase 2: ownership propagation analysis. Recalling the two conditions pro-
posed earlier in this section, condition (1) needs to know if the subject call-site is the
owner of the allocated memory object or not. On one hand, the escape analysis tracks
the propagation of the memory object upwards in call-graph beyond the allocating
function boundaries. On the other hand, the consumer function detection tracks the
propagation of memory object downwards in call-graph. These analyses determine if
the subject call-site is still the owner of memory object. Such analyses are realized
via a customized data-flow analysis. They need to be path-sensitive, to differenti-
ate the conditional escape or consumption. They also need to be field-sensitive to
be able to track the pointer propagation via struct fields. Such analysis tracks the
def-use chain of an allocated memory object on each execution path. The escape
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analysis determines if the memory pointer is copied beyond the allocating function
(via a reference argument or global variable). The consumer function determines if
any callees of the allocating function are releasing the memory object or causing it to
escape. In either case, the allocating function is not the owner of the memory object
anymore. Otherwise, the allocating function is responsible for appropriately releasing
the memory object before returning.
Phase 3: missing deallocation detection. Once the previous phases finish, we
can evaluate condition (2) for the specific FOI. That is any potential execution path
missing appropriate release function is a potential memory leak bug. The context-
aware Rule Mining identifies appropriate release functions associated with each FOI,
and then escape analysis and consumer function detection analysis reason on the
owner of allocated memory object. For each FOI, any absence of associated deallo-
cation indicates a potential memory leak bug. These error-sites are then passed to
under-constrained symbolic execution to confirm their feasibility.
4.4 Allocation and Deallocation Identification
4.4.1 Identifying Allocators
The first challenge K-MeLD overcomes is identifying allocation functions, both
generic and specialized ones. Through the rest of this thesis we call such an allo-
cator a Function Of Interest (FOI). Manual identification of allocation functions in
an OS kernel is not practical. That is because various kernel modules have their own
specialized allocation functions. We need an automated way to be able to collect a
set of allocations including the specialized ones.
Observations. We observe that memory allocation is a critical operation, which
in case of success returns a pointer to the allocated memory region, whilst in case
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of failure it returns a NULL pointer. Because of this, the allocation functions are
followed by a null-check on their return value. When a memory object is allocated, it
requires initialization before being used effectively. An initialization is realized either
via an store instruction or a call to memcpy/memset with the allocated pointer as
destination. Such initialization must be performed before any read from the memory
object.
To summarize, an allocation function has the following properties.
• It returns a pointer.
• The pointer is NULL checked before actually being used.
• The pointer is not derived from another base pointer.
• The object is initialized before being used, e.g., being read.
Removing getter functions. Besides the allocator functions, there is another
class of functions that return a pointer and may be followed by a null-check. A getter
function is a function that produces a pointer out of one of its pointer arguments
either by indexing or accessing a field in struct. In order to exclude getter functions
from the set of initial allocators, we first profile all pointer-returning functions in the
kernel and mark those that their returning pointer is derived (calculated or accessed
via GetElementPtr) from one of pointer arguments as base pointer.
Characterizing Pointers. We evaluate the aforementioned properties via use-
finding and source-finding data flow. Use-finding is a forward data flow tracking that
determines the operations on a pointer. For example use-finding helps to identify
any null-check on a pointer. Source-finding is a backward data flow tracking that
determines what is the source of pointer. This, for example helps in determining if a
pointer is offset of a base pointer.
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At this stage, our analysis favors recall over precision in terms of the number
of null-check or initialization. More specifically, first we look for pointer returning
functions which are not profiled as getter function (i.e. offset returning) and are
followed by null-check and initialized in majority of their call-sites. This set will be
further refined when deallocation detection is finished.
4.4.2 Context-aware Rule Mining for Deallocation Identifi-
cation
After we identified allocation functions, we next identify the corresponding deallo-
cation functions. To do so, we use sequential pattern mining on the error-handling
operations.
Identifying and Collecting Error-Handling Paths.
It is a convention that failure of an operation in an OS kernel is reflected in a
return status, which in turn should be checked by the caller. The error handling
is responsible for recovering from errors and preventing the system from entering an
unstable or undefined state. Error-handling paths are relatively short, and have clean
and important operations to recover from the failure, this makes them a great place
to identify paired operations (e.g. release, unlock or close).
To identify error handling paths at each FOI call-site, we first extract intra-
procedural execution paths. To do so, we statically explore the control flow graph
(CFG) in a depth-first fashion. Each path starts from the function’s entry basic block
and ends in a basic block with return instruction as terminator. Loops are unrolled
for just one level. We also filter out the execution paths that do not go through the
FOI call. In most cases the FOI return status is checked5. If the call to the FOI
fails, the corresponding failure branch will not continue to use the resources (e.g., a
5If such a check is missing, it can be a missing-check bug. Since such bugs are out of the scope
of this proposal, if FOI is not checked, we assume it was always successful.
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pointer) returned by the FOI. Therefore, any paths following the FOI failure branch
are not interesting to us because there will be no memory leaks. For example, the
path going through line 15 of Figure 4.1 cannot lead to a memory leak of skb.
From the set of FOI success paths, we then identify error handling paths. If a
path explicitly returns an error code (similar to those used in errno in user space,
though kernel conventions use negative values) or NULL, it is an error-handling path.
Not all error-handling paths are simple to identify. In most cases, the return status
of an operation is checked, and if it turns out as an error code, the same error code
is propagated up to the caller.
Referring to Figure 4.1, the return status of call to crypto report alg() is
checked at line 24 and the same status code is returned. To identify such more
complicated error-handling cases, we look for a critical check. We define a critical
check as a check against zero or NULL that has no fall-through and leads to a return
instruction with an integer or NULL parameter. A zero/non-NULL return status in-
dicates that an operation was successful, while a non-zero (usually a negative errno)
or NULL return status is an indication of the operation failure. Therefore, for each
critical check, based on the check predicate we can determine which side of the check
is taken when an error happens. This way we can identify non-explicit error handling
paths like the one shown in Figure 4.1 line 24.
Sequential Pattern Mining. The mining is applied to the sequential patterns
of operations on error-handling paths of a given FOI. This way we can extract the
common patterns of error handling for each FOI. A key part of such a finding is which
release functions are used to de-allocate the allocated memory object. In terms of
memory management, it means when an allocation succeeds (i.e., the memory is allo-
cated), if an error happens later, how the allocated memory should be released. This
can be represented by a high-level rule in the form of 〈call FOI, check, release, return〉.
Such a sequential pattern of operations is important because the OS kernel has differ-
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ent mechanisms and functions to allocate and release memory dynamically. Finding
associated release functions for any FOI can be addressed via looking for the sequential
pattern of operations at the moment of error handling. Many specialized allocation
functions allocate and craft specialized memory objects, which in turn require spe-
cialized de-allocation. Using the rule mining technique we identify such specialized
release functions associated with a given FOI.
Frequent-pattern-mining algorithms expect the inputs in the form of a sequence
of operations. Once we extract the error handling paths as described in Section 4.4.2,
each path is transformed into a representation of sequential opcodes. To do so, we
retrieve the LLVM opcode of each instruction on the path and form the opcode
sequence. For the case of call instructions, we also retrieve the callee function name.
For each FOI, the opcode sequences are fed into the frequent pattern mining
algorithm. The result will be a set of opcode patterns associated with error handling
paths of the FOI. We take the most general pattern which by definition will be
covering the maximum number of error handling paths and use it to identify the
associated release function. Such a function is identified by cross-checking the result
of mining against the set of operations as the last operation on the allocated pointer.
Use-finding has a key role in here as we identify all operations that use a copy of the
allocated pointer and consider only such operations in rule mining.
4.5 Ownership Reasoning
Another key challenge we have to address to detect kernel memory leaks is to decide
where an allocated object is supposed to be released. In K-MeLD, we propose a new
ownership reasoning mechanism to infer the release locations. The ownership rea-
soning mechanism includes two components: enhanced escape analysis and consumer
function detection.
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4.5.1 Enhanced Escape Analysis
Understanding how a function manages the ownership of allocated memory is a key
factor in designing a precise memory leak detection technique. The second condition
of resource release bugs is that the owner function of the allocated memory fails to
release the allocated memory upon finishing the uses. If the allocating function passes
on the ownership of the memory object, then there will be no leaking problem if the
allocating function finishes without releasing the allocated memory. The ownership
can be transferred either via returning the allocated pointer or assigning the allocated
pointer to a global object or a reference argument. We call such ownership transfer
escaping the pointer.
For example Figure 4.3 shows a case of an escaping allocated pointer. Here the
allocated pointer escapes at line 33 via reference argument bounce buf ret. Look-
ing at the call graph reveals that the function hgcm call preprocess linaddr() is
called repeatedly by hgcm call preprocess(). Eventually bounce bufs is released
by the caller of hgcm call preprocess() which is vbg hgcm call(). But the code
in Figure 4.3 is still leaking memory at line 27, and it is because the pointer does
not escape on this path. This shows the importance of path-sensitive escape analysis
that we are employing to determine how the ownership of the allocation is changed.
The leak can be resolved by moving the assignment at line 33 to line 23. When an
allocated pointer is escaping on a path, then we assume there is another place of code
responsible to manage the allocation, and the current path is not further explored for
leak finding. This avoids the path-explosion problem and the tracking of complicated
data flows, which in turn reduces false positives.
As mentioned in Section 4.4.1 source-finding is a backward data flow tracking
which is employed to identify the sources of any destination that the allocation pointer
is copied into. Source-finding determines that the destination of the copy at line 33
is a function argument. We identify escaping pointers as the pointers that their
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1 /* File: drivers/virt/vboxguest/vboxguest_utils.c */
2 static int hgcm_call_preprocess_linaddr(
3 const struct vmmdev_hgcm_function_parameter *src_parm ,
4 void ** bounce_buf_ret , size_t *extra)
5 {





11 buf = (void *)src_parm ->u.pointer.u.linear_addr;
12 len = src_parm ->u.pointer.size;
13 copy_in = src_parm ->type != VMMDEV_HGCM_PARM_TYPE_LINADDR_OUT;
14
15 if (len > VBG_MAX_HGCM_USER_PARM)
16 return -E2BIG;
17
18 /* Memory is allocated here */
19 bounce_buf = kvmalloc(len , GFP_KERNEL);
20 /* Check for allocation success */
21 if (! bounce_buf)
22 return -ENOMEM;
23
24 if (copy_in) {




28 } else {
29 memset(bounce_buf , 0, len);
30 }
31
32 /* Allocation pointer assigned to a pointer argument */
33 *bounce_buf_ret = bounce_buf;
34 hgcm_call_add_pagelist_size(bounce_buf , len , extra);
35 return 0;
36 }
Figure 4.3: An example of escaping pointer: The allocation pointer bounce buf is
escaping via a pointer argument at line 33. But it is not enough to the prevent
memory leak at line 27 (CVE-2019-19048).
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ownership is passed to other functions, so it is safe if the current function does not
release them. To identify if an allocated pointer is escaping we should find any variable
that such pointer is copied into (via use-finding) and then determine the kind of the
destination variable (via source-finding). If the destination variable is used in a return
instruction, is a global variable, or is a function argument, then we can conclude that
the allocated pointer escapes.
Path-sensitive escape analysis. Such an escape analysis should be path-sensitive
as not all the execution paths may reach to the escaping point (as in Figure 4.3).
Therefore, after identifying error handling paths (as described in Section 4.4.2) we
perform escape analysis on each path. If the allocated pointer escapes on a specific
error handling path, then we exclude such a path from the rest of our analysis, because
the ownership is changed and the allocating function is not the sole entity having
a handle on the allocated memory. It means if the allocating function terminates
without releasing the allocated memory, there are still other live pointers to the
allocation and no memory leak yet has happened. Instead we collect the escaping
pointer information and go after the callers of the allocating functions one by one,
and look for potential memory leak. This requires an inter-procedural analysis to
track the operations performed on the escaping pointer in the context of the callers.
4.5.2 Consumer Function Detection
Consumer functions are another place that the ownership of an allocated memory
object is changed. An allocating function may pass the memory object to its callees,
so K-MeLD analyzes those receiving callees to make sure ownership is not changed
once returning from such callees. If the callee is a consumer, then there will be no
memory leak. It means any execution path that is going through a consumer function,
should be disregarded for memory leak detection.
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1 int cxgb4_get_srq_entry(struct net_device *dev ,
2 int srq_idx , struct srq_entry *entryp)
3 {
4 ...
5 struct adapter *adap;
6 struct sk_buff *skb;
7 ...
8 adap = netdev2adap(dev);
9 s = adap ->srq;
10 ...








Figure 4.4: Consumer function example: t4 mgmt tx() consumes the buffer skb un-
conditionaly.
Figure Figure 4.4 shows an example of consumer function. The specialized allo-
cator alloc skb() allocates a new network buffer skb at line 12. At line 16 skb is
passed to the function t4 mgmt tx() which in turn passes skb to ctrl xmit() at line
26. As the implementation of ctrl xmit() shows the buffer is consumed on all exe-
cution paths. More specifically, the skb is released at lines 36 and 47, and is escaped
via being added to a queue at line 42. This confirms the code at line 18 should not
release skb. This example shows how K-MeLD requires an inter-procedural analysis
to track skb across the function calls.
Remember at this stage K-MeLD knows associated deallocations of the FOI. So
a pointer receiving callee becomes a consumer when on all of its execution paths it
either releases or escapes the allocated pointer. This is realized by applying escape
analysis to the paths of the callee, and also tracking the propagation of the allocated
pointer in the callee to determine if it reaches any deallocation function.
Conditional consumers. While analyzing consumer function candidates, it may
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1 /* File: net/dsa/tag_ksz.c */
2 static struct sk_buff *ksz_common_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb ,
3 struct net_device *dev , int len)
4 {
5 ...
6 nskb = alloc_skb(NET_IP_ALIGN + skb ->len +




11 /* CONDITIONAL -CONSUMER */





17 /* File: net/core/skbuff.c */




22 if (! skb_cloned(skb) && skb_tailroom(skb) >= pad) {




27 if (likely(skb_cloned(skb) || ntail > 0)) {




32 err = skb_linearize(skb);
33 if (unlikely(err))
34 goto free_skb;







Figure 4.5: Conditional Consumer function example: skb put padto() consumes the
buffer skb on failure.
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be the case that the candidate consumes (releases or causes to escape) the mem-
ory object conditionally. For example in Figure 4.5 the allocated nskb is passed to
skb put padto() which tries to pad the buffer by calling skb pad(). If it fails to
do so, the memory object is released (as in line 39). But if it succeeds (as in lines 24
and 36) the ownership is not changed and the allocating function has to handle nskb
appropriately. K-MeLD handles such cases by first identifying the critical check at
line 12. Then via the condition predicate it determines if the current path is asso-
ciated with success or failure of skb put padto() as described in Section 4.4.2. For
example line 13 is associated with the failure, then when processing skb put padto(),
K-MeLD only considers failure execution paths (only paths ending at line 40). This
way K-MeLD determines the code at line 13 is not responsible to release nskb, and
there is no leak.
4.6 Detecting Bugs Using Mined Rules
At this point, we have all the requirements to check the satisfiability of the two mem-
ory leak conditions in section Section 4.2: the function owns the allocated memory
object, but fails to release it. As described in Section 4.4.1, we collect the initial
set of FOIs and then extract the error-handling paths as explained in Section 4.4.2.
These paths are fed into the rule mining to detect associated deallocation functions
as described in Section 4.4.2. We prune the escaping paths and those going through
consumer functions. The remaining paths are fed in a pattern-matching step to de-
tect the paths that miss the release function. K-MeLD filters out paths that match
the allocation-deallocation function pair. Furthermore, to prune any infeasible paths
resulting from correlated branches, we apply under-constrained symbolic execution
on each path that fail to satisfy patter-matching step.
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1 /* File drivers/crypto/mediatek/mtk -aes.c */
2 static int mtk_aes_record_init(struct mtk_cryp *cryp)
3 {
4 struct mtk_aes_rec **aes = cryp ->aes;
5 int i, err = -ENOMEM;
6
7 for (i = 0; i < MTK_REC_NUM; i++) {












20 for (; i--; ) {






Figure 4.6: An example of infeasible path introducing false positive.
4.6.1 Under-constrained Symbolic Execution
As introduced in Chapter 2, under-constrained symbolic execution is effective to an-
alyze parts of the code. It serves to impose relaxed constraints on the inputs of a
function by skipping the code preceding to the start of the function. This improves
the scalability of the analysis.
Infeasible paths stemming from complicated data flow can be hard to avoid for
static analysis tools. For example, Figure 4.6 presents an example where correlated
control flows lead to a false alarm. The allocation at line 8 is happening inside a loop.
If the code enters clean-up either via line 10 or 15, the loop at line 20 is responsible to
release any previous allocations. Counter i determines if there exist such allocations
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or not. A static control flow of this function may miss such correlation and assume
a path reaching the return instruction at line 25 without going into the body of the
for loop at line 20, leading to a false leak report.
To enable K-MeLD to skip infeasible paths like the one presented in Figure 4.6,
we adapted the under-constrained symbolic engine of Sys [10]. We customized the
symbolic execution engine to be able to evaluate the feasibility of potentially leaking
paths. Sys is only designed for intra-procedural symbolic execution, we enhanced the
memory model to make it inter-procedural (detailed in Section 4.7.6). This way we
were able to prune any infeasible path that were being reported as memory leak bug
by K-MeLD.
4.7 Implementation
We have implemented K-MeLD as multiple LLVM passes, integrated with Python
code to run the passes and rule mining, and then perform the pattern matching.
4.7.1 Potential Allocation Functions
As our ultimate goal is detecting memory leak bugs, we need to populate an initial
set of potential memory allocation functions. Such functions will become the initial
set of FOIs for the rest of our analysis. In order to scale to the large number of
specialized allocation functions in the kernel, we need this phase to be automated.
Using a preprocessing LLVM pass over all the kernel, we identify any pointer-
returning function. Then looking into the definition of that function, we make sure
the returning pointer is not derived from any pointer argument, because an allocation
function is supposed to return a previously non-existent memory object. To do so,
we use source-finding described in Section 4.4.1 to make sure the returning pointer
is a not coming from a pointer argument. After that, we look at the call-sites of the
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candidate allocator and using use-finding analysis determine if the returned pointer
is being null-checked and initialized or not. This can identify a caller function of a
primitive allocator (like kmalloc()) as a new allocator. Such design choice reduces
the tracking of complicated and lengthy data flows.
For some reasons not all memory allocations are null-checked. As an example if
flag GFP NOFAIL is passed to kmalloc(), the allocation cannot fail [56]. Additionally,
some primitive allocators like kzalloc() or kcalloc() zero-initialize the memory
object. Therefore, at this stage it is enough a candidate allocator to be null-checked
or initialized at least in 40% of cases (such threshold was selected based on empirical
observations in common allocators). This initial list of functions later will be pruned
when we apply release detection described in Section 4.4.2. Any function that fails to
yield at least one release function in rule mining will be discarded from the analysis
results.
4.7.2 Path Exploration
To identify error handling paths, as described in Section 4.4.2, we statically explore
the CFG and determine if a path is error handling or not. To avoid a path explosion
problem, in addition to loop unrolling, we set a hard limit to the number of paths
we explore per function. We also set a limit on the path depth to handle deep paths
like mutually recursive calls. In the current implementation, we set the both limits
to 1000. Such a limit was selected empirically to balance the pass running time and
the leak detection rate.
When exploring the paths, we keep track of the uses of the allocated pointer. For
each explored path, we maintain a list of opcodes that work on FOI result; specifically,
function calls that take the FOI result as an argument. Such call instructions, are
used for consumer function detection. For each explored path, we also record the last
call instruction taking the FOI result as an argument in a set called last foi use.
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4.7.3 Context-aware Rule Mining
For the purpose of sequential pattern mining, we employed the CloFAST [36] algo-
rithm. CloFAST is a fast algorithm for discovering closed sequential patterns from a
set of sequences. A sequential pattern is a sub-sequence that appears in many input
sequences, and intuitively a pattern is closed if it cannot be extended. More precisely
the support of a sequential pattern is the ratio of the number of times the sequential
pattern appears divided by the total number of input sequences. The input to the
CloFAST is a sequence database and a user-defined minimum support minsup. The
sequence database is a set of sequences where each sequence is a list of opcodes asso-
ciated with error handling paths as described in Section 4.4.2. The minimum support
is a frequency threshold in terms of percentage which is used to recognize a frequent
sequential pattern. A frequent sequential pattern is a pattern with a support level
of no less than minsup. A closed sequential pattern is a frequent sequential pattern
that is not a subset of any other pattern with the same support level. Discovering
closed sequential patterns is more efficient than finding all sequential patterns while
missing no information about the patterns [36]. Informally, as all sub-patterns of a
frequent pattern are also frequent, therefore mining closed sequential patterns avoids
generating unnecessary patterns and as a result yields savings of space and compu-
tational costs. In our implementation we empirically set the minsup to 0.6. In our
implementation we noticed a limitation of the mining algorithm with respect to the
number of input sequences. Meaning that the algorithm was not able to process all
execution paths even on a machine with a large amount of memory. We avoided this
limitation by first applying escape analysis to prune uninteresting paths, and then
feeding in the sequence of operations on each path as input to the mining algorithm.
Release Function Identification. Once the rule mining is finished, we will have a
set of sequential patterns for the specific FOI. We are interested in the patterns that
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follow the correct behavior of memory release; meaning 〈Call FOI, check, release,
return〉. Such a pattern is used to identify the associated release function to the
FOI. We cross-check the mined pattern against last foi use set populated at the path
exploration phase. This confirms the candidate release is the last function working
on the FOI.
4.7.4 Ownership Reasoning
Path-sensitive Escape Analysis. We employ escape analysis to track the owner-
ship of the allocated memory. K-MeLD’s use of escape analysis is inter-procedural
in that if a pointer escapes from the current function f , it is never reported as a leak
from f . However all the callers of f are tracked to check for leaking the pointer.
Consumer Function Path Profiling. For the purpose of consumer function
detection, K-MeLD analyzes any called function that takes the allocated pointer as
an argument. It labels the callee paths as success or failure based on the return code.
Then each caller path is associated with either of these path collections. If the caller
path takes the success side of the consumer candidate, then callee’s success paths are
considered for releasing or escaping the allocated pointer, and vice versa.
Inter-procedural Data Flow. At multiple stages, K-MeLD employs inter-
procedural data flow analysis to track the allocated pointer. For each LLVM call
instruction taking allocated pointer as an argument, we determine the argument in-
dex in the call instruction. Then in the definition of the callee we start tracking the




When we have identified the release functions associated with the specific FOI,
K-MeLD then goes through the error handling paths extracted for the FOI and
applies pattern matching. The patterns are of the form 〈call FOI, check, call release,
return〉 where any call to the identified release functions will match the call release
item.
Any path failing to match in the previous step will be further investigated for
potential consumer functions. K-MeLD looks at the function calls on the allocated
pointer and checks if the associated paths in the callee are consuming the pointer or
not. If consuming, such a path is disregarded as a potential bug.
This way any error handling path deviating from the common approach of memory
releasing will be found. Then such bug candidate paths are sent to under-constrained
symbolic execution to identify and prune any infeasible path.
4.7.6 Under-constrained Symbolic Execution
Paths collected with pattern-matching step need to be reconstructed in the symbolic
execution engine. To do so, we pass the function name and the basic block number
associated with the errorsite. In the symbolic execution engine, we construct all
paths from the function entry to the target basic block. Under-constrained symbolic
execution engine examines these these specific paths for feasibility.
The symbolic execution engine in Sys [10] is intra-procedural. We needed inter-
procedural under-constrained symbolic execution to confirm reachability of the buggy
points along the call graph. To enable inter-procedural symbolic execution, we need
the global call-graph (which is already constructed in pre-processing phase) along with
the call site information. Using the call graph, we identify callers of the function with
the potential leak. The call site information consists of the basic block pertaining the
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call instruction and the list of function arguments. The calling basic block is required
to construct paths from the caller function’s entry point to the calling basic block.
The list of arguments is required to let the symbolic engine construct inter-procedural
path constraints. First the engine finishes symbolically executing the callee. Then for
each feasible path we re-use the same symbolic state containing the path constraints
and list of variables to construct path constraints in the caller. We only need to add
an extra assignment on the function arguments to the local variables in the caller’s
context used in the call instruction. As an example, if function F has an argument
x, when the caller makes a call to F and passes y as parameter to F , then the engine
adds an assertion of the form x == y when path constraints in the caller are formed.
Sys symbolic execution uses a linear memory model and assumes the pointers can-
not alias. To enable inter-procedural symbolic execution we needed to make changes
in the way the pointers are assigned. Once a pointer is allocated, Sys assigns a fixed
location in the linear memory to that pointer. This causes problem when we want
to carry constraints from the callee to the caller symbolic state. That is because the
caller and callee pointers alias when an object is passed from the caller to callee. To
solve this, we first maintain a map from the type of allocated pointers to the addresses
assigned. When creating a new symbolic state for the caller, we use this map to relax
locations that a pointer of a specific type may point to. This way, when we assert the
equivalence of function arguments to the local variables in the caller, the SMT solver
can resolve which address to use for the pointer.
These changes allowed us to use inter-procedural symbolic execution and prune
infeasible paths to the potential leaking point in the code. Once the under-constrained
symbolic execution determines that a path is feasible, we report it for manual audit.
When we confirmed that it is a memory leak bug, then we prepare a patch to fix the
bug and submit the patch to the code contributors.
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4.8 Evaluation on the Linux Kernel
The effectiveness and scalability of K-MeLD is evaluated on the Linux kernel, version
5.2.13-stable. We compiled the kernel code into LLVM bitcode using allyesconfig,
and got 18074 LLVM IR bitcode files.
4.8.1 Set of Allocations and Associated Deallocations
Using the methods described in Section 4.4.1 we populated an initial set of 4621
candidate allocator functions. Furthermore, once the rule mining finished, those
failing to produce at least one associated deallocation, are pruned. This left us with
807 allocation functions6
These functions are considered as FOI for our evaluation. These FOIs have a wide
range of frequency (some with many call sites, some with just a few), and so demon-
strate K-MeLD’s effectiveness for both general-purpose and specialized allocation
functions. Withing this set of 807 functions, there are 4 generic allocation functions
(like kmalloc()) with over one thousand callsites, along with more specialized al-
location functions with callsites down to 2 (like charlcd alloc()). K-MeLD was
able to find the associated release functions for even the most specialized allocation
functions (with as few as 2 callsites). Looking at the FOIs and associated releases,
we identified only 15 false positive cases (1.8%). Moreover, there were allocators
like fscache alloc retrieval() that were not selected as FOI, but were covered by
K-MeLD. These functions are either escaping the allocation through pointer argu-
ments, or did not pair with a specific deallocator. But essentially they are using other
primitive allocators like kzalloc and are processed as escaping functions. Looking into
the internal of 807 FOIs, we found a small number of primitive allocators (21 FOIs,
6The full list is available at: https://github.com/Navidem/k-meld/blob/main/results/
FOIs.txt
4.8. Evaluation on the Linux Kernel 64
comprising 2% of all selected FOIs) that are used to perform the actual allocations.
This selection of allocation and associated deallocation functions are necessary for
effectively detecting memory leak bugs. To the best of our knowledge, none of the
previous detection techniques used such a rich set of allocation-deallocation functions.
4.8.2 Found Bugs
In total, K-MeLD generated 373 leak warnings. After manual audit we confirmed
218 new memory leak bugs. This means K-MeLD is bearing 41% false positive. We
reported the number of bugs based on the patches submitted, meaning that a single
patch sometimes covers multiple memory leaks in the same function. 41 of memory
leak bugs reported by K-MeLD received CVE IDs.
The bugs we found are spread among the most common allocation functions
like kmalloc() (with 9244 call-sites) and kzalloc() (with 9926 call-sites); to the
most specialized allocation functions like sync file alloc(), edac mc alloc() and
nlmsg new() with 2, 17 and 333 call-sites, respectively.
From the perspective of specialized modules, among 218 detected bugs, 115 were
related to the FOIs with 400 call-sites or less. These results demonstrate the utility
of K-MeLD to detect memory leak bugs even in specialized kernel modules.
4.8.3 False Positive Analysis
K-MeLD has a false-positive rate of 41%, which is acceptable for a static analysis
tool applied to an OS kernel. We revisited the false warnings issued by K-MeLD to
get an understanding on the sources of such false positives.
Customized device-managed allocations caused false warnings. These are driver-
specific allocations that autonomously release all the allocated resources at the time of
device detachment. Uncommon specialized release functions which K-MeLD fails to
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identify in the rule mining step are another source of false positives. These functions
do not pass the minimum threshold of mining and are basically not a wrapper for the
common release functions; therefore failure to identify these functions contributes to
the number of false alarms for K-MeLD. For example, K-MeLD correctly identi-
fied kmem cache free() as the release for kmem cache alloc(), but in 9 cases the
allocated cache is released via abort creds().
4.8.4 False Negative Analysis
K-MeLD misses memory leak bugs if the allocation function is not in the set of FOIs.
Additionally, even though we incorporate inter-procedural escape and consumer func-
tion analysis, these analyses are not complete and there may be cases where pointer
propagation is lost due to aliasing or complicated data structure assignments. In order
to perform a false negative analysis we decided to use 17 previously detected memory
leak bugs which were assigned CVEs as ground truth. These bugs were spread among
multiple versions of the Linux kernel over the span of 10 years. Instead of compiling
multiple versions of the kernel, we reproduced each bug by applying the inverse of
the proposed path to the same kernel version we were using for our experiments.
Table 4.1 shows the results of this analysis. Out of 17 cases, it turned out one was
false positive and the initially merged patch was reverted later7. K-MeLD correctly
identifies 9 of those memory leaks, and correctly identifies the reverted one as an
escaped pointer. Two of those bugs are out of scope, as the source of the bug is not
missing a release function, but API confusion8. Four of the bugs were not reproducible
due to the code structure changes between kernel versions. Finally, K-MeLD missed
one bug due to complicated pointer propagation. More specifically, the allocation
7CVE-2019-12379: commit 84ecc2f was reverted by 15b3cd8.
8The leak happens because kvm pin pages() expects size, but kvm unpin pages() expects the
number of pages as argument.
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Table 4.1: False Negative Analysis results based on previous memory Leak CVEs
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function causes the allocated pointer to escape by adding it to a list in a field of
reference argument. K-MeLD loses the track of the pointer when it gets to the
caller.
Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter we summarize what has been presented in this thesis and discuss
potential future directions that can be taken for each of the projects.
5.1 Quantitative Information Flow Analysis
In quantitative information flow analysis the goal is measuring the amount of informa-
tion flow from secret input to public output. We built upon an existing tool named
FlowCheck [75] which employs a bit-level taint tracking along with accounting for
implicit data flows. To measure the maximum information flow from the constructed
data flow source to the sink, it looks for minimum-cut and returns the weight of such
cut as the maximum amount of information leaked. FlowCheck is scalable but less
precise compared to symbolic execution-based influence measurement, therefore we
proposed a novel method to apply symbolic execution on smaller regions of the code to
retrieve influence of the input data on the output of the region. Such tighter regional
influence measurements will then update the global data flow graph which in turn
affects the final maximum influence measurement. We devised multiple static and
dynamic data tracking techniques along with an annealing-based region exploration
to decide which code regions work the best for symbolically measuring the influence
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over. Our tool named FCFB, showed its effectiveness on three use case binaries. In
all of these cases FCFB provided a tighter yet correct total maximum influence from
the secret input to the public output.
Possible future directions. Our FCFB prototype proved the effectiveness of the
mixing data flow and symbolic execution idea. Furthermore, there are multiple po-
tential improvements that can be evaluated. First of all, currently we are selecting
just one region of code for symbolic execution. Expanding the regions excessively,
increases the chance of symbolic execution failure due to increased path constraints
complexity and as a result timeout. It is promising to consider how to choose multiple
smaller regions for symbolic execution and update the global flow graph accordingly.
Second, the current searching strategy is only benefiting from control flow structures
for the purpose of region selection. This is while there are rich structures of data flow
which can provide more help in terms of region selection. Third, the proposed sym-
bolically influence measurement can become an optional region evaluation to vanilla
FlowCheck. Currently, FlowCheck either analyzes a computation either without or
with enclosure regions to contain the side effects of implicit flows. Symbolic influence
measurement can be considered as a third method of flow evaluation for a computa-
tion like branch or loop structures. Last but not least, improving scalability of the
underlying tool-chain to support more diverse set of instructions (like floating point
instructions) can increase the applicability of such analysis tools.
5.2 Static Vulnerability Detection
Memory leak bugs are a serious security vulnerability in critical systems like OS ker-
nels. In Chapter 4 we presented K-MeLD, an effective and scalable static memory
leak detection tool for kernels that may consist of many modules. K-MeLD can
detect memory leak bugs not only on general allocation functions, but also on spe-
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cialized allocation functions with only a handful of call sites. K-MeLD first identifies
allocation functions via a structure- and usage-aware approach, then associated deal-
locations are determined by using a sequential pattern mining technique. To detect
memory leak bugs, K-MeLD reasons on the ownership of the allocated memory ob-
ject to determine the location of expected dealocation call. Such reasoning is realized
via inter-procedural and path-sensitive escape and consumer-function analysis.
Possible future directions. The general approach of rule mining employed in
this paper can be applied to any resource release bugs. Even though we applied
K-MeLD to memory allocation operations, the general idea of learning the correct
sequence of critical operations from the majority of the code and looking for devia-
tions is applicable to other resource acquisition operations. Another common case is
locks: when a function acquires a lock, any potential error-handling path must release
the lock. We leave such extensions for future work. As described in Section 4.7.6,
we adapted under-constrained symbolic execution to eliminate infeasible paths to the
buggy points. Such infrastructure can be used for exploitability verification. Gener-
ally, confirming a bug is exploitable or not is a very challenging problem. Dynamic
approaches and fuzzing techniques try to start from the code entry points and detect
bugs along their exploration of the big search space. Here, we can use the statically
detected buggy point of code as a target and look for a path backward to the kernel
entry points. Three major attacker-controlable entry points in the Linux kernel are
system calls, interrupt handlers, and IO handler functions. A backward traversal on
call-chain like the technique presented in [72] can be useful to identify feasible paths
starting from the buggy point towards the kernel entry points. Specialized path selec-
tion mechanisms are required to prioritize which caller to take when moving backward
on the call-graph. K-MeLD is also extendable to other OS kernels like FreeBSD. It
requires compiling the source code into LLVM IR and then running K-MeLD on it
to collect leak reports, and then auditing the reports.
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[46] H. S. Gunawi, C. Rubio-González, A. C. Arpaci-Dusseau, R. H. Arpaci-Dusseau,
and B. Liblit, “EIO: Error handling is occasionally correct.” in FAST, vol. 8,
2008, pp. 1–16.
[47] D. Henderson, S. H. Jacobson, and A. W. Johnson, “The theory and practice
of simulated annealing,” in Handbook of metaheuristics. Springer, 2003, pp.
287–319.
References 76
[48] W. E. Howden, “Symbolic testing and the dissect symbolic evaluation system,”
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, no. 4, pp. 266–278, 1977.
[49] R. Hund, T. Holz, and F. C. Freiling, “Return-oriented rootkits: Bypassing
kernel code integrity protection mechanisms,” in USENIX Security Symposium,
2009, pp. 383–398.
[50] A. W. Johnson, Generalized hill-climbing algorithms for discrete optimization
problems. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1996.
[51] J. Jung, H. Hu, D. Solodukhin, D. Pagan, K. H. Lee, and T. Kim,
“Fuzzification: Anti-fuzzing techniques,” in 28th USENIX Security Symposium
(USENIX Security 19). Santa Clara, CA: USENIX Association, Aug.
2019, pp. 1913–1930. [Online]. Available: https://www.usenix.org/conference/
usenixsecurity19/presentation/jung
[52] Y. Jung and K. Yi, “Practical memory leak detector based on parameterized
procedural summaries,” in Proceedings of the 7th international symposium on
Memory management. ACM, 2008, pp. 131–140.
[53] M. G. Kang, S. McCamant, P. Poosankam, and D. Song, “DTA++: dynamic
taint analysis with targeted control-flow propagation.” in NDSS, 2011.
[54] K. Kennedy, A survey of data flow analysis techniques. IBM Thomas J. Watson
Research Division, 1979.
[55] K. W. Kennedy, “Node listings applied to data flow analysis,” in Proceedings
of the 2nd ACM SIGACT-SIGPLAN symposium on Principles of programming
languages, 1975, pp. 10–21.
[56] Kernel.org, “kmalloc,” 2019, https://www.kernel.org/doc/htmldocs/
kernel-api/API-kmalloc.html.
[57] ——, “Slab allocator,” 2019, https://www.kernel.org/doc/gorman/html/
understand/understand011.html.
[58] S. Kim and S. McCamant, “Bit-vector model counting using statistical estima-
tion,” in International Conference on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction
and Analysis of Systems. Springer, 2018, pp. 133–151.
References 77
[59] J. C. King, “Symbolic execution and program testing,” Communications of the
ACM, vol. 19, no. 7, pp. 385–394, 1976.
[60] S. Kirkpatrick, C. D. Gelatt, and M. P. Vecchi, “Optimization by simulated
annealing,” science, vol. 220, no. 4598, pp. 671–680, 1983.
[61] C. Koulamas, S. Antony, and R. Jaen, “A survey of simulated annealing ap-
plications to operations research problems,” Omega, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 41–56,
1994.
[62] E. Larson and T. M. Austin, “High coverage detection of input-related security
faults.” in USENIX Security Symposium, 2003.
[63] Y. Li, Z. Su, L. Wang, and X. Li, “Steering symbolic execution to less traveled
paths,” ACM SigPlan Notices, vol. 48, no. 10, pp. 19–32, 2013.
[64] Z. Li and Y. Zhou, “Pr-miner: automatically extracting implicit programming
rules and detecting violations in large software code,” in ACM SIGSOFT Soft-
ware Engineering Notes, vol. 30, no. 5. ACM, 2005, pp. 306–315.
[65] B. Livshits and T. Zimmermann, “Locating matching method calls by mining
revision history data,” in Proceedings of the Workshop on the Evaluation of
Software Defect Detection Tools. ACM, 2005, pp. 296–305.
[66] E. S. Lowry and C. W. Medlock, “Object code optimization,” Communications
of the ACM, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 13–22, 1969.
[67] K. Lu, A. Pakki, and Q. Wu, “Detecting missing-check bugs via semantic-and
context-aware criticalness and constraints inferences,” in 28th USENIX Security
Symposium, 2019, pp. 1769–1786.
[68] K. Lu, C. Song, T. Kim, and W. Lee, “UniSan: Proactive kernel memory initial-
ization to eliminate data leakages,” in Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security. ACM, 2016, pp. 920–
932.
[69] K. Lu, M.-T. Walter, D. Pfaff, S. Nümberger, W. Lee, and M. Backes, “Unleash-
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[88] C. Rubio-González, H. S. Gunawi, B. Liblit, R. H. Arpaci-Dusseau, and A. C.
Arpaci-Dusseau, “Error propagation analysis for file systems,” in ACM Sigplan
Notices, vol. 44. ACM, 2009, pp. 270–280.
[89] S. Ruder, “An overview of gradient descent optimization algorithms,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1609.04747, 2016.
[90] S. Saha, J.-P. Lozi, G. Thomas, J. L. Lawall, and G. Muller, “Hector: Detecting
resource-release omission faults in error-handling code for systems software,” in
2013 43rd Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems
and Networks (DSN). IEEE, 2013, pp. 1–12.
References 80
[91] P. Saxena, R. Sekar, and V. Puranik, “Efficient fine-grained binary instru-
mentationwith applications to taint-tracking,” in Proceedings of the 6th an-
nual IEEE/ACM international symposium on Code generation and optimiza-
tion, 2008, pp. 74–83.
[92] D. Schoepe, M. Balliu, B. C. Pierce, and A. Sabelfeld, “Explicit secrecy: A
policy for taint tracking,” in 2016 IEEE European Symposium on Security and
Privacy (EuroS&P). IEEE, 2016, pp. 15–30.
[93] E. J. Schwartz, T. Avgerinos, and D. Brumley, “All you ever wanted to know
about dynamic taint analysis and forward symbolic execution (but might have
been afraid to ask),” in 2010 IEEE symposium on Security and privacy. IEEE,
2010, pp. 317–331.
[94] V. Sharma, N. Emamdoost, S. Kim, and S. McCamant, “It doesn’t
have to be so hard: Efficient symbolic reasoning for CRCs,” in BAR
2020, Workshop on Binary Analysis Research, 2020. [Online]. Available:
https://dx.doi.org/10.14722/bar.2020.23011
[95] D. Song, D. Brumley, H. Yin, J. Caballero, I. Jager, M. G. Kang, Z. Liang,
J. Newsome, P. Poosankam, and P. Saxena, “Bitblaze: A new approach to
computer security via binary analysis,” in International Conference on Infor-
mation Systems Security. Springer, 2008, pp. 1–25.
[96] Y. Sui, D. Ye, and J. Xue, “Static memory leak detection using full-sparse
value-flow analysis,” in Proceedings of the 2012 International Symposium on
Software Testing and Analysis. ACM, 2012, pp. 254–264.
[97] W. Wang, K. Lu, and P.-C. Yew, “Check it again: Detecting lacking-recheck
bugs in os kernels,” in Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, 2018, pp. 1899–1913.
[98] X. Wang, H. Chen, Z. Jia, N. Zeldovich, and M. F. Kaashoek, “Improving inte-
ger security for systems with KINT,” in 10th USENIX Symposium on Operating
Systems Design and Implementation (OSDI 12), 2012, pp. 163–177.
[99] W. Weimer and G. C. Necula, “Mining temporal specifications for error
detection,” in Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Tools and
References 81
Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems, ser. TACAS’05.
Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2005, pp. 461–476. [Online]. Available:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-31980-1\ 30
[100] R. Williams, “A painless guide to crc error detection algorithms,” Internet
publication, August, 1993, Available: http://ross.net/crc/.
[101] J. Xiao, H. Huang, and H. Wang, “Kernel data attack is a realistic security
threat,” in International Conference on Security and Privacy in Communication
Systems. Springer, 2015, pp. 135–154.
[102] Y. Xie and A. Aiken, “Context-and path-sensitive memory leak detection,” in
Proceedings of ESEC-FSE. ACM, 2005, pp. 115–125.
[103] W. Xu, J. Li, J. Shu, W. Yang, T. Xie, Y. Zhang, and D. Gu, “From colli-
sion to exploitation: Unleashing use-after-free vulnerabilities in linux kernel,”
in Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Com-
munications Security. ACM, 2015, pp. 414–425.
[104] D. Zhu, J. Jung, D. Song, T. Kohno, and D. Wetherall, “Tainteraser: Protect-
ing sensitive data leaks using application-level taint tracking,” ACM SIGOPS
Operating Systems Review, vol. 45, no. 1, pp. 142–154, 2011.
